


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
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FROM THE EDITOR

The MIPB staff welcomes the Intelligence Corps' new commanding general, Major General John F. Stewart Jr., as well as Command Sergeant Major Robert T. Hall. Be sure to read their first columns in this issue on pages 2 and 3. Major General Stewart has already begun to use MIPB to get the word out to the MI community. He writes: "...we must profoundly change the way we conduct intelligence in this world of crisis management....I ask that you take mental note and that in the future, as we work together to adapt MI to the new environment, you provide your own ideas for integration into future MI doctrine, training, and operations." If we heed these words, we can all be a part of the profound changes that will guide MI in the future."

In this issue we address intelligence support to the Battlefield Operating Systems viewed from outside the MI field. I want to thank Major Ira Richardson for his help with this series. The support the S2 gives the commander is critical to the success of any operation. Our feature stories focus on the relationship between the S2 and combat arms and service support units. As an intelligence professional, you must know your enemy; but just as important, you must know your unit. You cannot just consume or relay information and expect to win; just as the commander drives intelligence, you must do your job to dynamically support the commander. Intelligence must be the true combat multiplier.

I wish to extend my appreciation to the five authors of the letters to the editor in this issue. This is exactly the feedback we need. This is your journal and we hope you continue to support it.

We are planning to publish articles on El Salvador and Battle Labs in future issues of MIPB.



LETTERS

Dear Editor:

Dr. Alan R. Goldman and Eric Vardac's article, "Threats to the New World Order" (Jan-Mar 1993), addresses the issue of threat analysis in the post-Cold War period with a great deal of expertise and clarity. Their analysis certainly hit the bull's-eye, as far as I am concerned. I have always felt that, as a nation and a military, we lack an appreciation of history. Our lack of cultural and historical understanding has often gotten us into a great deal of trouble, such as in World War II, the Korean Conflict, the Bay of Pigs, the Tet Offensive, and Vietnam in general.

It is clear, the deployment of U.S.

combat forces into the Balkans would be a serious mistake. The Balkans has every negative ingredient that Vietnam did. It seems everyone is touting the superiority of our air power, but unlike Iraq, there are few distinguishable air targets in the Balkans. Certainly we should do everything, short of committing ground troops, to stop Serbian aggression. However, history sounds an alarm which is quite clearly advocating caution when considering deploying troops into the Balkan quagmire.

Along with a lack of history, we, as a military, have been unable to grasp the concept which will enable us to predict future events or enemy ac-

tion—predictive analysis. We have become expert at "bean counting," or rather the ability to inform our commanders as to what the enemy has in the way of troops and equipment. However, Army doctrine is strangely quiet when it comes to the subject of prediction. There is very little mention of a detailed process by which an analyst may inform his or her commander as to the enemy's most probable course of action. The lack of emphasis regarding predictive analysis may be due in large part to the subconscious fear of being **wrong**. It is much easier to count vehicles, than to predict what those vehicles will do.

(Continued on page 48)

VANTAGE POINT

By Major General John F. Stewart Jr.

As the new Chief of the Military Intelligence Corps, I am proud to serve our Army and soldiers and to lead our Corps in these times of continuity, change, and growth. So in this, my first column in **Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin**, I want to address where MI has been and where, I believe, we must go.

This July, the MI Branch celebrated its 31st anniversary, a young branch in the Army, but one which has matured rapidly, especially over the last 20 years. In that time, we created an MI Corps that is integral to combat organizations. To do that we eliminated the "stovepipes" in CI and SIGINT, and we broke down the so-called "green door." We created multidiscipline MI battalions at division, and brigades at corps. We oriented our training on tactical- and operational-level intelligence support to combat commanders. In so doing, we created leaders and soldiers who understand tactics and who are technically proficient to focus downwardly the Battlefield Operating System we call Intelligence on commanders who lead soldiers in combat.

We have done this by making sure our officers progress through a series of rights of passage as combat battalion and brigade S2s, MI battalion and G2 staff officers, and commanders. We revamped BNCOC and ANCOC, emphasizing leadership and technical MI skills. Today, although MI is a shortage branch, we fill over 90 percent of all combat battalion S2 positions with captains. Most are graduates of the advanced course and many have company command experience. All division and corps G2s, as with their compatriots on the general staff, are handpicked for their broad tactical and joint experience.

This maturity of MI paid off in Desert Storm with Army Intelligence performing far better than at any time in history. Army combat commanders, like General Franks, will tell you that MI was there when called. That performance was due to magnificent soldiers and a team effort.

Desert Storm occurred as the Cold War ended, bracketed by the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the end of the Soviet Union with the August 1991 coup in Moscow. I do not have to describe the dizzying changes that have been and

are taking place geopolitically. Nor do I have to review the momentous reorientation, restructure, and reduction we are going through in our Army. But allow me to dwell a few moments on the changes underway in Army Intelligence.

After Desert Storm, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (CSA), took steps to review Army operations. He did that both to assess lessons learned from the Gulf War and to review Army doctrine, training, and organization in a new geopolitical setting. In a few months, really, we have moved from a national security strategy of deterrence to one of force projection. This is having a profound effect on Army thinking, from the new cornerstone doctrinal manual, **FM 100-5, Operations**, published on the Army's birthday in June, to training at our Combat Training Centers where we have moved from Cold War scenarios to those that call for sophistication across the spectrum of operations and that put a premium on operating in a coalition.

An MI Relook

As part of this overall Army effort to adopt to a force projection type of mission, MI has also undergone significant introspection. In the summer of 1991, we conducted a detailed assessment—called MI Relook—of how MI operated in the Gulf, and how MI must support commanders in scenarios that range from peacekeeping to large-scale conflict. We concluded with several significant findings that are the basis for major changes in MI. These findings and proposed changes are contained in the Force Design Update, approved by the CSA earlier this year. You in our MI Corps are witness to and are helping to make these changes.

In our assessment, we found that—

- ☐ MI had a breach, a gap, between echelons above corps (read INSCOM) and corps, and below.
- ☐ While intelligence was timely, continuous, and available at corps level in the desert, it was unevenly disseminated to division and spotty, at best, at brigade.
- ☐ The MI battalion at division was nearly one dimensional, oriented on SIGINT (with the ex-

(Continued on page 38)

By Command Sergeant Major Robert T. Hall

I hope to use this column, my first as the MI Corps CSM, to convey some thoughts which I believe are important to soldiers, their families, and the intelligence community.

Before I share these concerns, I'd like to thank all of you for the warm reception. This has been one of the smoothest transitions Huguette and I have experienced. We owe our good fortune to you, the professional, caring people of Fort Huachuca. In return, we will represent the command to the best of our ability and will always keep your best interests uppermost in our minds.

As the Corps CSM, I have high expectations of our NCOs and the soldiers they lead. My philosophy is simple: give 150 percent all of the time; be at the right place, at the right time, in the right uniform, with the right attitude. These coupled with your intelligence training make you second to none. When all NCOs and soldiers meet these requirements, the mission is 100 percent complete. The discipline gained by these standards fosters maximum productivity, and ensures fit-to-fight, ready units.

I expect our NCOs to be leaders whose focus is training, counselling, and soldier welfare. I expect sergeants to mentor and challenge their soldiers, so they can achieve plateaus they never dreamed they could. Soldiers must be encouraged to be creative and look for smarter ways to accomplish the mission. However, it remains the NCO's responsibility to guide them. Whether you're training CTT, MOS, or even PT, soldiers must be proficient in every phase of every event. Literally, their lives depend on it, on today's modern, technological battlefield and in everyday life. I view training as the top priority; there can be no substitute.

NCOs must counsel their soldiers. You are not serving your subordinates well if you provide counsel only occasionally or just when the soldier has erred. Counselling lets soldiers know what is expected of them. As NCOs, you owe it to your soldiers to tell them where they stand professionally. If sergeants are not providing their soldiers with professional counsel, they are not living up to the trust their superiors have placed in them, and are not worthy of their stripes. Steady counselling

shows you care.

Soldier care is paramount—it's what "the backbone of the Army" does. NCOs have the inherent duty to look out for soldiers. We must know where they live and what their living conditions are; we must inspect their clothing and equipment constantly to ensure their ability to fight is not impaired; we should know what the soldier's goals are; we should know who family members are and if there are any problems; we should keep the lines of communication open 24 hours a day. Our soldiers' concerns should never be unimportant. We must do everything in our power and resources to improve and sustain their quality of life. "Soldiers First" is a motto I hold dear, and I expect all NCOs to pursue soldier care issues with the same vigor as I do.

My expectations are high, as you can see. But this is a two-way street. I know your expectations of me are likewise lofty, and I assure you, I will commit the same 150 percent I expect of you.

On July 9, we celebrated the dedication of our new NCO Academy. This is a dream come true, for we now have an academy that represents our MI Corps and all NCOs in a very dynamic way.

The barracks is named in honor of Army Master Sergeant John R. Wilson who served in the Pacific Theater during World War II. There, MSG Wilson attained the rank of major, shortly after his discharge in 1947, though, he reenlisted as a master sergeant. In the Korean War, he served with the 25th CI Corps Detachment, and had a reputation for seizing the initiative. While leading Korean police in the capture of an enemy-occupied village, MSG Wilson was killed. His actions led to the capture of 21 enemy soldiers. For this act of bravery, he was posthumously awarded the Silver Star.

Ice Hall, named in honor of Command Sergeant Major Clovis D. Ice, houses the academic classrooms. CSM Ice was a pioneer in MI Airborne and Special Forces operations, and helped design direct support tactical SIGINT operations. He also helped design the manpack intercept equipment which revolutionized SIGINT support to commanders. A soldier's soldier, CSM Ice possessed a

(Continued on page 39)

Tactical Intelligence and the Commander



*The "Deuce" was my alter ego.
He knew me. He knew the enemy.
He knew my unit.*

by Major General William G. Carter III

One of our most memorable military slogans is, "Intelligence is for the commander." **FM 100-5, Operations** (June 1993), tells us: "The commander drives the intelligence effort. He must ask the right questions and focus the intelligence work. He must know the enemy; the commander's personal involvement and knowledge have no substitutes."

My experiences at the National Training Center (NTC) and during Operation Desert Storm are that if the commander articulates his vision clearly to his staff through PIR, then tactical intelligence will be a combat multiplier. But the S2 cannot do it alone.

In all the units I have commanded, the "Deuce" was my alter ego. He knew me. He knew the enemy. He knew my unit. This type of close and continuing relationship is the key to intelligence operations answering the commander's PIR. My S2 knew his battlefield operating system (BOS) and displayed confidence in his staff's work. He never hesitated to go "one-on-one" with me as we developed our estimates. In doing so, he challenged my conventional wisdom and I, his intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process.

We both learned. Our professional exchanges were stimulating, vital, and required! Unfortunately, we rarely see this type of bold exchange within units training at the NTC. The question is, "Why not?"

The answer lies in lessons learned at the NTC: the S2 is not establishing himself as the commander's intelligence expert, and commanders are not clearly stating their PIR in their planning guidance to their staffs. The S2, in too many cases, is not establishing himself as a vigorous, spirited BOS integrator during the staff planning process. Consequently, the S2's ability to identify critical intelligence gaps through the IPB process (which is pivotal to mission accomplishment) is not being realized.

Tactical intelligence soldiers should reread Chapter 3 of **FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield**. If the commander's planning guidance omits PIR, the S2 must capture them through the IPB process. As the S2's relationship with the commander strengthens, the commander will increasingly include PIR along with the restated mission in his planning guidance to the staff. Through both the commander and his staff, the S2 has two opportunities to focus intelligence operations and to support the plan to find and kill the enemy.

I believe these lessons learned show that commanders drive the IPB process, and that S2s must



get commanders to plan and control intelligence operations with the same level of interest and personal involvement they devote to combat operations:

- ☐ IPB is the vehicle.
- ☐ BOS integration during the wargaming process is the route.
- ☐ The S2 is the "key" driver.

I am excited about the MI Corps' training plan to "license" the S2s. I pledge the NTC's commitment

to train the combat team on intelligence operations. The articles from NTC trainers in this issue of **Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin** discuss battle-proven techniques that will ensure the success of tactical intelligence as a combat multiplier.

LEAD! TRAIN! WIN!

Major General William G. Carter III is the Commanding General of the NTC and Fort Irwin, CA. Formerly, he was Assistant Division Commander in the 1st Infantry Division (Mech), Fort Riley, KS, and fought with the division in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

First to Fire: The ADA Officer and the S2

by Major Dale C. Eikmeier


"Air defense? Why ask me, I'm the S2. Ask the ADA LNO, he's over there."

To some, air defense and air defense artillery (ADA) are synonymous. After all, isn't the Air Defense BOS the responsibility of air defense artillerymen? Unfortunately, this is a misconception that leads to the de-synchronization of air defense and maneuver. It explains why units fail to integrate air defense into their IPB process, and subsequently, the scheme of maneuver. However, the S2 can be a key force in synchronizing our air defense and ground maneuver plans.

My experience is that while S2s can competently discuss the enemy's ground force doctrine and order of battle, few understand the enemy's synchronization of ground and air forces. But we do share some common doctrine:

- ☐ **Student Handout 34-80-1, Air Defense Artillery Military Intelligence Handbook**, discusses the ADA officer's responsibilities to the S2 and to the IPB process.
- ☐ **FM 34-130, Appendix C**, details IPB in air defense, counterair, and air operations.
- ☐ **FM 34-130, Annex C**, states that the modern battlefield is three dimensional: width, depth, and airspace.

Yet we continue to view the ground and air as separate elements. Too many commanders and S2s are satisfied with a two-dimensional IPB product that omits or discounts the enemy's use of air power and air space.



So How Can We Ensure BLUEFOR Is First To Fire?

S2s must be willing to consult with the ADA liaison officer (LNO) when defining the enemy's air doctrine. Specifically, ADA/Intelligence BOS integration must show how enemy air power and air space management are synchronized with the opposing force (OPFOR) ground plan. Requiring ADA to provide only the air order of battle, and not tasking ADA through the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan to report air activity by named area of interest (NAI), is a "check the block" mentality that fails to tell the commander what he needs to know about the air threat facing his unit. If our air defense is to be effective, we need specific PIR that ask the when, where, and how of enemy air.

The goal of air defense is to counter the enemy's use of air and to de-synchronize it from his ground forces. This is a special enemy characteristic the S2 should discover as he develops the critical events list and the event template. When the S2 section's 96B (Intelligence Analyst) does his initial planning, he must get the ADA section to help him understand the enemy's air doctrine.

The lesson learned is that the Intelligence BOS does not have to do it all. You must hold all BOSs accountable for knowing and demonstrating enemy doctrine about their BOSs. Commanders should observe BOS integration that yields superior IPB. The S2's choice of enemy courses of action must reflect knowledge of how the enemy plans to support his ground plan with air, what his



targets are, and when and where he'll commit air. In addition, the S2 must involve ADA LNOs in the IPB process.

Air IPB

The S2, in coordination with the ADA Battalion S2 and the air defense officer/LNO, should develop the aerial portion of the IPB. There is a misconception that air IPB is a separate product, used only by ADA. The enemy's use of air is as much a part of his plan as fire support, maneuver, and intelligence and electronic warfare. Air power is a combat multiplier that supports the ground plan. Air is not a free agent on the battlefield. Its use always carries a price tag. If we cannot see the synchronization of ground (including pickup and landing zones) and air, our air defense efforts will not be effective.

The threat evaluation stage of the IPB process must include air. The situation template should include—

- ☐ Locations of potential air assault objectives.
- ☐ Air avenues of approach.
- ☐ Forward alighting areas.
- ☐ Ground forward air controllers.
- ☐ Aerial engagement areas.

Then counterair NAI, target areas of interest (event template), and decision points (decision support templates) must be developed and tasked. When developing the R&S plan, the S2 should consider the air threat and include ADA sensors and counterair taskings. Development of requests for information answering PIR must include the enemy's air capability.

When the S2 and ADA talk, the right questions are asked and wargamed. Knowing the doctrinal use of air—when and where—is more useful than sortie rates. When briefing the threat and writing the intelligence annex, include the air threat. But remember that threat discussion must go beyond sortie rates and types of aircraft. It must tell the commander when and where he will see enemy air. After all, the unexpected arrival of enemy attack helicopters can be as devastating as an unexpected flank attack on the ground.

ADA/Intelligence BOS Integration reduces surprise and enables you to be the first to fire.

Major Dale C. Eikmeier is NTC's senior air defense trainer. He served as the S3, 2d Battalion, 3d ADA, 1st Infantry Division (Mech), and served in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

King of Battle: Why S2s Must Hold Court with FSOs

by Major David E. Mock

The sound of freedom is silent without intelligence first, intelligence second, and intelligence third. With this in mind, I want to share some lessons learned about what field artillerymen need from the MI community, or to be more specific, from heavy brigade S2s. Without you, we are not on time, nor on target. My experiences at the NTC and during Desert Storm support the thesis that Fire Support and Intelligence BOS integration kills the enemy. Let me explain how this happens and what fire support assets are available to help you in your collection plan efforts.

To begin with, we need heavy brigade S2s who are familiar enough with fire support to provide the precise intelligence that artillerymen need. The best manuals to help you in this effort are **FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tar-**

geting Process; and FM 6-20-40, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Brigade Operations (Heavy).

Both of these manuals provide an in-depth analysis of the topics this article only touches on. Read them during your sergeant's time. Have the fire support element (FSE) NCOIC teach a block of instruction on these topics. BOS integration at the enlisted level is key to success since over half of the soldiers in the S2 section and the FSE are enlisted.

Next, you need to develop a special relationship with the fire support officer (FSO), because so much of the FSO's business starts with your products. Talk to the FSO daily and learn as much about targeting as you can. You are both focused deep to hurt the enemy deep. The time and space variables from the event template make targeting possible and predictable. Your ability to focus the targeting



effort ensures lethal fires for killing the enemy.

Ensure your S2 section develops a close bond with the fire support element (FSE). One of the members of the FSE is the targeting officer. Invite him to your training and establish regular and continuing contact with him. His counterparts are the assistant S2 and the battlefield information coordination center officer.

To get communication going among all of these players, you might try team sports competition or computer gamesmanship. Chess and checkers teach time and space management, critical to targeting and event templating. Whatever methods you choose, do it regularly and long term. This cross-talk will also familiarize you with the targeting trilogy of **Decide/Detect/Deliver** as described in FM 6-20-10.

Decide/Detect/Deliver

The S2, the FSO, and the S3 are the core of the targeting team, along with other primary staff officers. The fire supporter depends on the S2 to assist in taking the high value targets and developing high payoff targets. MI is critical in the decide and detect phases; the direct support artillery battalion makes the "delivery."

During the wargaming process, the targeting team **decides** which targets to attack to support the scheme of maneuver.

The next step is to **detect** the targets you have decided to attack to ensure the success of your unit's mission. Your intelligence cycle has a similar step called collection. You and the FSO together develop the collection (R&S) plan. The FSE uses your modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO), events analysis matrix (often misstated as a critical events list), and templates. The firing batteries use meteorological data from the staff weather officer. Brigade operations and intelligence (O&I) net updates are copied and integrated into the fire support plan. You are a producer and supplier to the FSO; you help him keep a focused scheme of fires.

Assets Available to You

The FSO reciprocates by providing several key assets. The maneuver brigade has three combat observation/lasing teams (COLTs). These highly trained teams are lethal. They can enable you to confirm your template, to observe NAI/TAI, and to report combat information. However, they do not report over the brigade O&I net. They report over the fire support net. The S2 must get combat information from the FSO since his reports are often more timely than task force scout reports.

Each team has a sergeant, a fire support specialist, and a driver/radio operator (private first class) mounted in an M981 fire support vehicle. The teams are equipped with ground/vehicular laser locator designators (G/VLLDs) and communications assets.

The COLT is designed to maximize the use of smart munitions and can be used with any munition requiring reflected laser energy for final ballistic guidance. The G/VLLD provides accurate range, azimuth, and vertical angle to a target 10 kilometers away. It accurately lases up to 3 kilometers for a moving target and 5 kilometers for a stationary target. The COLT can provide early warning and can destroy high payoff targets.

The S2, however, must never task COLTs in his collection plan without consulting with the FSO. There are technical requirements in a COLT's positioning that allow it to accurately engage targets with smart munitions. Each task force has company fire support teams with the same equipment and capabilities as the COLTs. Therefore, the same rule applies for your task force S2s: **never task a fire support team without consulting with the task force FSO.**

Your brigade may also have OH58-D helicopters for use as target acquisition assets. Some divisions have a policy that the OH58-D be used as a fire support platform and not an R&S observer. The BOS integration by fire support, close air support, and intelligence will define aerial observation tasks in the R&S plan. Discovery occurs during the IPB process directed by the S2.

Additionally, BOS integration will achieve target refinement. The helicopter can acquire deep targets for the brigade; collect and report battlefield information; and provide early warning surveillance. The OH58-D can fire targets with all fire support assets, including smart munitions. Find out more about this asset from your FSO or Army aviation LNO.

The FSO and targeting officer will ask you lots of questions about where you have the regimental artillery group (RAG) and division artillery group (DAG) templated. Most FSOs "sponge" off the S2. Take this as a compliment, though. Counterfire concerns are easier for you and the FSO to resolve because you template RAGs and DAGs as the entire unit. Your main disagreement with the FSE will be over templated enemy company positions versus platoon/hull positions at the brigade S2 level. The brigade may have weapons-locating radars available for specific operations.

Remember, as you're working with the **detect** function of the targeting process and the develop-

ment of your intelligence collection plan, the weapons-locating radars are the primary means to locating enemy indirect fire assets. Tasks for the radars should be integrated into collection plan priorities and noted on the DST for special action at specific points in the battle. The supervision of the target acquisition effort with radars rests with the FSO, the targeting officer, the direct support artillery battalion S2, and you, the maneuver brigade S2.

The Inertia Factor

The Fire Support and Intelligence BOS integration must overcome some degree of inertia in three other areas.

1. How to make sure the horizontal pipeline between primary staffs and the vertical pipeline between the S2 and the COLTs is not clogged. The S2 should ask his staff, "Do you know what enemy the COLT is shooting?"

2. How to speak with the direct support artillery


battalion S2 (usually an FA, not an MI officer), knowing he has a radio for monitoring the brigade O&I net but may not be on it?"

3. How to train, rehearse, and resource the R&S assets so that they survive, report, and kill the enemy?

These fire support "souls" are in your hands. BOS integration is their lifeline.

This information gives you some idea about what we need from you and what assets are available to you in doing your job. Yours is an important contribution to the success of our mission; but, in turn, the FSO and his multitude of fire support assets are willing and able to help you. Most important, talk to the FSO. You and he are truly a **TEAM OF TEAMS**.

Major Mock is NTC's brigade FSO trainer. He served with the VII Corps FSO during Desert Storm.



by Major Stuart E. Deakin and Sergeants First Class Jerry Weed, Larry Brock, Rudy Maggay, and Barry Monson

"We Don't Jam Grid Squares!"

There seems to be a misunderstanding about the capabilities and limitations of a direct support, tactical electronic warfare (EW) unit.

It is true, we do not jam grid squares. But we do jam FM radio receivers that occupy space on the battlefield, and whose location is expressed by a

EW Tactics: Massing Electronic Bullets

universal transverse mercator (UTM) grid coordinate. The bottom line is that we jam radio receivers and we intercept radio transmitters. This very simple concept is the most basic and important EW concept. As such, it should be in all our planning, preparation, and execution procedures; and yet, rarely is it considered in any of these.

Surely, anyone familiar with EW understands the concept. But why do we overlook it in the tactical employment of EW systems? Could it be that we don't really understand it, even though EW targeting for intercept, direction-finding (DF), and jamming depends on a thorough understanding of this concept? A review of some targeting "numbers" will help clarify this concept, as well as the others discussed below.

There are over 300 radio transmitters and receivers in a full-up motorized rifle regiment (MRR), including associated combat support and combat service support elements. These transmitters and receivers operate on more than 20 communications nets and use the entire FM spectrum. A U.S. Army direct support EW unit has three or four intercept



systems and from one to three jamming systems. EW units conduct voice collection intercept, DF, ground surveillance radar (GSR), and jamming operations. Jamming operations (electronic attack) are defined as one of two standard tactical missions: **to disrupt** communications, or **to deny** communications.

Depending on the type of intercept systems available, an EW unit can direction-find from one to eight nets at a time. Voice collection operations can be executed against a number of nets equal to the total number of EW systems. This is usually about 11, if systems are fully manned and operating. Jamming operations **to deny** communications require the concerted efforts of a jamming system with at least one supporting intercept system. Operations **to disrupt** communications have a much less defined system requirement. The EW unit cannot execute any of these operations unless they know who they're listening to, and they cannot be successful unless they know when and where to execute.

So how do we **mass electronic bullets**? The answer is through targeting. The EW company/team must focus on the most important transmitters and receivers, at the critical time and place on the battlefield. Tactical EW soldiers must look for and apply the maneuver decision support template to their targeting criteria. Some of the following concepts will show you how to apply EW on the tactical battlefield. These concepts are based on NTC lessons learned from over 40 rotations.

If He's Talking, You Must Be Listening

What produces timely, useful combat intelligence and successful jamming effects is the sheer volume of effort the EW company/team expends. There is no such thing as instant intelligence. The EW company/team is neither equipped nor manned to be the battlefield **CNN**. The team must first recover and identify enemy frequencies. Then they must analyze the traffic on those frequencies to identify the nets. Initially, net and node identification is time-consuming. Yet this process is absolutely essential to successful jamming and collection operations.

The most successful jamming support in the last two years at the NTC came from an EW company/team that maintained intercept capability 24 hours a day for the 14-day rotation. Its EW intercept and jamming teams produced over 1,500 hard-copy tactical reports (TACREPs). The sheer volume of TACREPs flowing into the EW company/team enabled analysts to quickly identify OPFOR nets and to organize the technical data needed to execute

the jamming missions. This massive collection effort resulted in the OPFOR commander being "pushed" to 13 different command and control frequencies during a three-hour jamming mission. At one point in the battle, subordinate elements operated on four different frequencies.

In another mission, a similar effort enabled this same EW company/team to produce the most effective combat intelligence of any EW company/team. While the number of TACREPs was less, the detail contained in the TACREPs and the focused tasking effort of the company/team tactical operations center resulted in a higher quality intercept and reporting.

Those analysts contributed more to the EW effort than the operators did. In 12 hours, the unit plotted over 100 direction-found radio transmissions. In yet another mission, analysts received enough intercept information to accurately plot all the OPFOR obstacles. The maneuver task forces were able to initiate a deliberate attack with an accurate overlay of the obstacles, maneuvering around them rather than having to breach them. **This is a clear example of IEW as a combat multiplier.**

Both of these EW company/teams are similar in organization. Each had four operational TRAILBLAZER DF platforms and two jamming systems. One excelled at jamming and the other at intelligence production. There are several reasons for this, but the overriding reason was the focus provided by the maneuver brigade combat team the EW unit was supporting. In one unit, the brigade staff planning process produced detailed jamming requirements for the EW company/team. In the other, the brigade commander's focus was on intelligence production. In addition, G2s helped S2s understand their commander's intent for IEW, and how to anticipate PIR that will show up in the commander's planning guidance.

The EW Targeting Effort

Electronic engagement areas (EEAs) and electronic support templates (ESTs) have never been used at the NTC (at least during our watch). However, EW units that have had the most success with either intelligence production or jamming effects have used these concepts in their planning, preparation, and execution procedures.

EEA refers to the physical location on the battlefield where the specified EW jamming or collection/DF targets will be when the mission is to be executed. Since timing and distance are key elements of the S2's event template, they are scrutinized by the intelligence EW support officer.

← BOS →

The EST incorporates the timing of these missions in relation to friendly and enemy events. The EST details the locations, time on station requirements, and movement and execution triggers for individual EW assets and missions.


The brigade staff develops EEAs during its planning process. EEAs show **when** and **where** the EW company/team needs to apply pressure against enemy electronic targets. This is based on the unit's scheme of maneuver and the commander's intent. (See Figure 1.) There is an endless number of electronic targets on the battlefield, and the EEAs help the EW company/team focus and prioritize their efforts. Since only a limited number of targets can be attacked in any given time, the directly supported combat arms unit must detail its priorities and requirements for every phase of the

operation.

The EW company/team develops the EST during its planning process. This management tool details the positioning, repositioning, and mission execution triggers of individual assets. (See Figure 2.) The EW company/team develops all ESTs in relation to the expected list of critical friendly and enemy events that the S2 and staff develop during their planning process.

We Jam Receivers and Intercept Transmitters

In the final analysis, the supported combat unit commander's PIR must clearly and definitively tell the EW unit what enemy capability he wants to intercept and direction-find. He must describe, through the R&S plan, when, where, and what he




EW EXECUTION MATRIX

TIME WINDOW	EEA	EVENT	ES TASK	EA TASK
051800-052200	1	DIV RECON ENTERS SECTOR	1. REPORT TIME AND LOC 2. REPORT COMP AND MVT	1. DISRUPT COMMO IN SPT OF COUNTER RECON
051900-H+HOUR	2	DIV RECON IN SECTOR	1. LOC AND ID MOUNTED AND DISMOUNTED	1. DISRUPT COMMO/SPT CENTER RECON
EENT +/-1 HR	3A/3B	ENEMY AIR ASSAULT		DETAILED ES AND EA TASKINGS AND PRIORITIES
H-HOUR	4A/4B	1ST ECH MFBs		
H+20 MIN	5	MRR EFFORT TURNS SOUTH		
H+1 HR	6A/6B	DIRECT FIRE CONTACT		
O/O > H+30 MIN	7	COMMIT BDE RESERVE		

COMP: COMPOSITION
MVT: MOVEMENT

Figure 1. Electronic Engagement Areas.



TIME	EVENT	ACTION
051700	OPERATIONAL TOS NLT	1. COLLECTION TMS AT P1, P2, P3 JAMMING TMS AT J1, J2 2. ALL GENERAL SEARCH
051800 (O/O)	DIV RECON (EEA1)	3. P3 EXECUTES DF/COLL (EEA1) J1 EXECUTES EA (EEA1)
051900 (O/O)	DIV RECON (EEA2)	4. SAME AS 3 (EEA2)
051930	AIR ASSAULT (EEA3A/3B)	5. P2 EXECUTES DF/COLL (EEA3A/3B) J2 EXECUTES EA (EEA3A/3B)
H-HOUR	MRB CROSS T1 (4A) (4B)	6. P1 REPOSITIONS TO P1A OR P1B P3 REPOSITIONS TO P3A P2 EXECUTES DF/COLL (4A/4B/5) J1 REPOSITIONS TO J1A
H+20 MIN	MRB CROSS T2	7. P2 AND P1 OR P3 COMPLETE REPOSITIONING P2A/P3A OR P1A/P1B
H+30 MIN (O/O)	BDE RESERVE COMMITTED	8. P1 OR P3 EXECUTES ES (EEA7) 9. J2 EXECUTES EA (EEA7)
H+1 HR	DIRECT FIRE CONTACT	10. J1 EXECUTES MRR EA (EEA6A/6B) J2 EXECUTES MRB EA (EEA6A/6B) P1 ES SUPPORT TO J1 P3 ES SUPPORT TO J2 P2 EXECUTES COLL (EEA6A/6B)

AA: AVENUE OF ADVANCE
O/O: ON ORDER
ES: ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT
EA: ELECTRONIC ATTACK

needs to know about the enemy. For jamming purposes, the commander's intent must define the desired effects of jamming. Only then will the right receivers be targeted. When this happens, tactical IEW truly becomes a combat multiplier.

The EW company/team, must then develop a plan to focus their collection and jamming efforts at the critical time and place on the battlefield. To realize the supported units desired effects, the EW unit must mass its "electronic bullets" at that "grid square" at the precise point in time.

Continuous EW pressure against the enemy's critical nets, using both collection and jamming, will significantly reduce his capability to impose his will upon us. If he says it, we must either hear it or Jam it.

MAJ Stuart Deakin is the MI company/EW trainer, with 20 rotations at the NTC. SFCs Larry Brock and Rudy Maggay serve as GSR and REMBASS trainers. SFC Jerry Weed is the EW platoon trainer, with over 35 rotations. SFC Barry Monson is the EW team and individual trainer. He is a Russian linguist and previously served at Field Station Berlin.

MPs and the S2: More than Covering the Rear

by Sergeant First Class Timothy Sumner

Why is it that of all the MP battlefield missions, R&S is the least understood and exploited? The answer may lie in the fact that MPs are often considered only for rear area operations. "Out of sight, out of mind" seems to be the prevailing sentiment of brigade R&S planners where the brigade's DS MP platoon is concerned. Nevertheless, the MP platoon is one of the S2's most lucrative R&S assets and should be integrated into every combat mission. (See figure below.) This article provides some suggestions on how to integrate MPs into the R&S planning process. Remember S2, MP area security missions include a lot more than rear area operations.

A Two-Way Street

The MP platoon leader attending NTC for the first time quickly learns why the enemy's situation is at the beginning of operations orders, and why he needs to BOS integrate with the S2 as soon as possible. On one hand, the MP platoon leader needs the S2's intelligence summaries, graphics, and the secure communications fill to monitor and report on the O&I net. On the other hand, the S2 needs the DS MP platoon's FM net frequency. (See





figure above.)

While the S2 focuses on the deep and close fights, the MP platoon faces rear area threats without the usual support of the division's MP company commander or provost marshal. Yet MPs are more than just a quick reaction force. They are all over the battlefield, and they can provide timely, critical combat information. They do, however, take some looking after and planning consideration. Just as battalions often neglect to adequately support and employ GSRs, S2s often ignore and restrict MP platoons in the R&S plan.

How can we do better?

1. The S2 must mentor the MP platoon. At home station, include MPs in your sergeant's time, officer professional development sessions, and command post exercises. MPs need to be schooled in—

- ☐ IPB.
- ☐ SALUTE reporting over the O&I net.
- ☐ Reporting by NAI and target area of interest (TAI).
- ☐ Security vs R&S missions identified by the S2 in the staff planning process.

One lesson learned at the NTC is that the MP platoon leader should attend all brigade and R&S rehearsals. This BOS integration speeds combat



information to users, and aids in the protection of the MPs.

2. The MP platoon leader must teach the S2 section what he can and cannot do for brigade operations. Each three-person MP team is prepared to conduct combat, combat support, and combat service support operations:

- ☐ **Combat operations.** As a flexible economy of force, MPs conduct combat operations against the rear threat. This threat is likely to be high, given the sophisticated ranges of weapons, enemy air mobility, and radio electronic combat.
- ☐ **Combat support operations.** MPs help move combat resources, such as replacement troops, ammunition, and materiel critical to victory. They also evacuate enemy prisoners of war from the battle area for safeguarding, tactical debriefings, and interrogations.
- ☐ **Combat service support operations.** The MP's primary role in these operations is to provide commanders with law and order. They also support special assignments, such as passage of lines and river crossings. At the NTC, MPs are invaluable for battlefield circulation control at key terrain identified by the S2's MCOO.

The enemy continuously attempts to disrupt brigade operations with division and regimental reconnaissance and ground, air, and chemical attacks. (MPs have to study **FM 34-130** and a stack of other manuals before they ever go to the NTC.) However, BOS integration can prevent the enemy from succeeding in these efforts. In this case, BOS integration is better served by tasking MPs to find and report on the enemy (SALUTE), rather than to engage him in combat.

The NTC R&S effort has been successful when the MP platoon was tasked to observe and report on an air assault landing zone NAI. However, the S2 has had great success when that NAI is time-phased. This makes the most of the MP's limited "eyes on the event" assets. The S2 can also help the MPs by cueing the observation to a block of time. Remember to include the MPs in your O&I net calls.

So who and what are these MPs?

A DS MP platoon consists of two squads. Each squad consists of three MP teams, a platoon leader with an MP driver, and a platoon sergeant. All the platoon's armored HMWVs are equipped with secure radios. Each team carries a mounted, crew-served weapon. This varies according to the platoon's TOE, but usually consists of two M60 ma-

chine guns and one Mark-19 per squad. In addition, each team has a machine-gun scope, an antitank weapon, and night vision goggles. They are truly a highly mobile, flexible combat force.

As with IEW assets, MP assets are limited. Missions must be limited to one role at a time. The MP platoon leader should conduct continuous utilization planning with the brigade S3 and the S2 in order to accommodate competing taskings. The commander must clearly state his intent for the MPs so that they are not overtasked in the staff planning process. (Normally, the MP platoon leader does not attend these meetings.)

What Can MPs Do?

During defensive operations, the squad's key role is area security. These operations must be conducted as far forward in the rear area as possible. MPs search for, report on, and destroy the enemy. The destruction role can make a decisive difference to the brigade's targeting team if the NAI is also a TAI. NAI, particularly enemy air assault landing and drop zones, can become TAI if the air assault is to be engaged and destroyed immediately.


The MP platoon leader designates squad and team areas of operations according to the METT-T factors (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time). (See figure next page.) MP squads execute their missions using a combination of observation posts and mobile patrols.

One squad typically deploys on main supply routes forward in the brigade rear area and monitors the situation from key terrain. The S2's MCOO is used in choosing the best terrain. The other squad conducts area reconnaissance closer to the brigade support area and responds to threats. Remember S2, an MP SALUTE report of "no activity" at a given point in time is as significant as observed activity.

The MP platoon's greatest challenge is an enemy penetration. These 21 soldiers can identify, report, disrupt, and delay a threat that may be too large for them to destroy. However, they need to know the enemy's likely COA, mobility corridors, tactics, and capabilities. MP and Intelligence BOS integration makes this happen. Because MP teams fight a series of delays and disengagements, their success depends on—

- ☐ Terrain analysis.
- ☐ Prior coordination with base and base clusters on their plans to defend and evacuate.
- ☐ Availability of indirect fires.
- ☐ How well they can shoot, move, and communicate.

MP COMPANY EMPLOYMENT



All of this is easier said than done, and it consumes valuable time to accomplish. Getting to know each other and keeping the other guy informed through BOS integration is the key to mission accomplishment. Without it, the S2 can find himself in an "arresting" situation.

Endnote

The first and second Figures are extracted from FM 19-4, Military Police Team, Squad, Platoon Combat Operations.

An MP for 19 years, SFC Timothy Sumner is NTC's senior MP comba. trainer.

Honest ABE and the S2: Breaching the Obstacles to Get Good Tactical Intelligence

by Lieutenant Colonel William C. West

Consider this commander's #1 PIR: "S2, where are the enemy's obstacles in the subsequent and forward positions in the division security zone?"

Let me share with you some lessons learned as to how the S2 should "breach" this R&S challenge. It begins during home station training with the assistant brigade engineer (ABE) officer; it continues with R&S rehearsals that include the engineer reconnaissance platoon leader; and it finishes with appropriate BLUEFOR engineer task organization to overcome verified, templated obstacles to mission accomplishment.

The bottom line is that BOS integration between Intelligence and Mobility-Countermobility-Survivability (M-CM-S) (often referred to as the Engineer BOS) must happen.

The ABE is the tip of the M-CM-S BOS iceberg. Other elements in the S2's IPB process are—

- ☐ The engineer battalion S2.
- ☐ The engineer reconnaissance platoon.
- ☐ The engineer battlefield assessment.
- ☐ Obstacle templates.
- ☐ Terrain analysis.
- ☐ Terrain management.
- ☐ Engineer IPB.

Unfortunately, the brigade S2 often fails to ex-



exploit all these resources. In that case, how can we do a better job of breaching the obstacles to mission accomplishment? Here are some suggestions.

Know Each Other's Doctrine

To learn about each other's doctrine—

- ☐ Read and discuss **FM 90-13-1, Combined Arms Breaching Operations**, during sergeant's time and officer professional development sessions.
- ☐ Expect the ABE to be the OPFOR engineer expert and to know that tactical obstacles are emplaced at approximately one half the range of weapons in the main belt defense.
- ☐ Have the ABE template obstacles on your situation templates and COA sketches.

Provide engineer training aids for brigade and R&S rehearsals. Remember, even our engineer doctrine requires IPB. (See **FM 90-13-1, Annex B**).

Another good doctrinal reference is **FM 30-10, Military Geographic Intelligence (MGI) (Terrain)**. The effects of weather and terrain on military operations affect the commander's ability to exploit the advantages of terrain. What most NTC brigade combat teams discount is that tactical geographic intelligence is often secured locally, because it's not always provided by a higher headquarters terrain team. Our mutually supporting doctrine instructs us to BOS integrate, and to go out and get obstacle intelligence.

Answer Commander's PIR on Obstacles

The commander's PIR on obstacles are not

there by accident. (The chart below shows an example of required reconnaissance information and engineer PIR.) To ensure success when breaching against a defending enemy, the commander must have his PIR answered. And tactical intelligence is required in all the breaching fundamentals:

- ☐ **Suppression** includes electronic attack.
- ☐ **Obscuration** addresses the factors of line of sight and OCOKA (observation and field of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach and mobility corridors).
- ☐ **Security** considers enemy counterattacks and avenues of approach.
- ☐ **Reduction** requires accurate SALUTE reports of breach lanes to and from grids, Class IV stockages, and maintenance.

Successful breaching, by definition, means that the PIR on obstacles were answered before line of departure.

The required level of obstacle intelligence detail differs at brigade and TF levels. Successful R&S can influence decisions to conduct in-stride, deliberate, or hasty breaches. At the TF level, an in-stride breach would be used if the S2 told the commander that the tactical obstacles were lightly defended. Unfortunately, in-stride breaches most often occur because R&S failed to discover the obstacles. This can and does result in heavy BLUEFOR casualties.

Inevitably, the S2 is held responsible for poor predictive obstacle intelligence, and the S3 is hit for not resourcing and conducting an adequate R&S.

SAMPLE OF REQUIRED RECONNAISSANCE INFORMATION AND ENGINEER PIR

OBSTACLE RECON		RIVER CROSSING SITE RECON		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● TYPE OF OBSTACLE. ● SIZE (DEPTH, WIDTH). ● LOCATION AND ORIENTATION. ● FOR MINE FIELDS: ARMED? NUMBER/TYPES OF MINES? BURIED OR NOT? AP OR AT? A/H DEVICES? ● POSSIBLE BYPASS. ● KEY TERRAIN AND APPROACHES FOR BREACH. ● ENEMY ACTIVITY IN THE AREA. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● LOCATION. ● BANK CONDITIONS/PREPARATION. ● RIVER DATA: WIDTH, DEPTH, VELOCITY (4 ft MIN FOR RIBBON BRIDGE). ● DESCRIPTION OF ANY IN-PLACE BRIDGES OR FORDS. ● POSSIBLE LOCATIONS OF EEPs AND CFAs. ● CONCEALED RAFT CONSTRUCTION SITE LOCATIONS. ● FORDABILITY. 		
ENGINEERS AS SCOUTS		VEHICLE	MAXIMUM DEPTH	MAXIMUM % SLOPE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● ENGINEER RECON ELEMENTS WILL BE GIVEN SPECIFIC TARGET RECON MISSION AND WILL ALWAYS BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT A STEALTH BREACH ON ORDER. ● RECON ELEMENTS WILL MONITOR AND REPORT ON ENGINEER NET WHEN POSSIBLE. 		TANK	1.05 m	50
		APC	0.75 m	33
		5 TON	0.75 m	33
		HMMWV	0.75 m	33
		HEMMT	1.05 m	33
ENGINEER PIR:		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. IDENTIFICATION OF KEY TERRAIN OR CHOKE POINTS. 2. LOCATIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS OF ENEMY OBSTACLES AND FORTIFICATIONS. 3. LOCATION, SIZE, AND ACTIVITY OF ENEMY ENGINEER UNITS AND EQUIPMENT. 4. CROSS-COUNTRY MOBILITY. 5. LOCATIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS OF RIVER CROSSING SITES. 6. IS ENEMY BRINGING BRIDGING EQUIPMENT FORWARD? WHERE? HOW MUCH? 7. LOCATION AND DESCRIPTION OF ENGINEERING MATERIALS OR EQUIPMENT. 8. LOCATIONS OF AIRFIELDS AND THEIR CAPACITY. 		
		* MAY USE MORE BASED ON METT-T.		



The TF commander's PIR will focus on the size of enemy forces and the types of obstacles facing the battalion. BOS integration will help prevent unexpected obstacles.

Use Your BOS Integration Assets

The Engineer BOS integrators will expand under engineer restructure initiatives now being developed in Army divisions. The Engineer BOS includes—

- ☐ An engineer battalion commander (lieutenant colonel).
- ☐ The engineer battalion S3 (major), who also serves as the OIC of the ABE section on the brigade staff.
- ☐ The ABE (captain).
- ☐ The ABE NCOIC (sergeant first class, MOS 12B, combat engineer).
- ☐ Two specialist 4's (MOS 12B, combat engineers).
- ☐ An M557 driver (also a 12B).

As in the brigade S2 section, more than half of the soldiers in the Engineer BOS are enlisted. These soldiers are capable of conducting BOS integrated IPB. You can make sure that happens by including them in your sergeant's time, Terra Base map exercises, team sports, and OPD. Invite the corps MGI detachment to training. "Reading the tea leaves" (otherwise known as interpreting the green obstacle symbology) is an art form that requires continuous training, practice, and diverse products. Do not rely on the NTC's 1978 terrain analysis for the school solution. Seek military geographic intelligence through an aggressive IPB process.

Define Functions

Make sure all the players know their functions. The S2 builds the R&S team and works with the S3 in resourcing the team. The S2 rehearses the team and assists in task organization. He portrays the uncooperative enemy in the staff planning process. Part of that "uncooperativeness" is an integrated OPFOR obstacle plan. The S2 must identify order of battle considerations concerning the mobile obstacle detachment and the mobile support detachment in his event analysis matrix.

The ABE should role model the OPFOR engineer during the staff planning process and at the brigade rehearsal. He should construct, account for, and place on the terrain board the enemy obstacles (including the family of scatterable mines) expected in that mission. BOS integration does not stop with the manuals. Please note that, while templating is always essential to focus the collection plan and staff wargaming, **too much time is often**

spent on templating at the expense of R&S.

Integrate Obstacle Intelligence

Obstacle breaching is not just getting to the obstacle, but rather getting to the far side of it while retaining your combat power. R&S will help you retain combat power and counter the enemy's use of obstacles. Obstacle intelligence is a combat multiplier and must be included in the scheme of maneuver.

The term "obstacle intelligence" refers to a specific group of M-CM-S combat information. The ABE knows this and, therefore, must help the S2 integrate it into the staff planning process, wargaming, and battle tracking. Obstacle intelligence includes—

- ☐ Obstacle locations.
- ☐ Obstacle orientation.
- ☐ Presence of wire, gaps, and bypasses.
- ☐ Stealth breaches.
- ☐ Mine field composition: buried or surface antitank and antipersonnel mines, antihandling devices, and depth and type of mines.
- ☐ Location of enemy direct fire weapons.

Exert extreme caution. Expect all obstacles to be covered by fires and observation. They will not be "fire and forget" techniques used by an unsophisticated enemy either. The ABE will help the S2 understand that the traditional face-value interpretation of the commander's PIR, in regard to obstacles, is a mine field in and of itself. Obstacle intelligence is hard to get and even harder to overcome if you don't get it before line of departure.

Summary

Knowing the terrain and how it will affect military operations is a necessary skill that BOS integration can train. In **FM 30-10**, Figure 1-3 summarizes Army reports used in geographic and terrain intelligence. You will be using them in your training.

Terrain is the common ground that you and the ABE must walk together. In many regions, terrain is the most important modifier of climate. The effects of terrain and weather are predictable, and your IPB process will discover the lay of the land. Let the ABE help you breach the uncertainties of that terrain. **Military geographic intelligence is for the commander.**

LTC West is NTC's senior engineer trainer. He has served as the S3, 3d Engineer Battalion, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), and in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.



Improving TF R&S Planning for the Deliberate Attack



by Captain John Frame

"Guidons, Guidons, this is mike 23, intel update follows, break. Enemy defending as per OPORD, break. Have identified wire and mine obstacle location November kilo 342171, break. Possible CSOP at November kilo 362155, break. One tank located November kilo 339185, break. One BMP dug in vicinity November kilo 328176, break. MRB combined arms reserve currently unidentified, out."

The unlucky Task Force (TF) that had to rely on this intelligence update lost the battle. The TF attack was unsuccessful because TF S2s and S3s failed to develop sufficient information about the enemy defense before the TF crossed the line of departure (LD).

Why Do We Fail?

Many of us have been in this same situation. At the NTC, it is a fairly common scenario for deliberate attack. All too often though, the required information on the enemy is not collected and disseminated before the TF crosses the LD. Most of the failures in this area can be attributed to faulty R&S planning at the TF level because TF S2s and S3s frequently do not develop an R&S concept. Using a poorly developed plan, they dispatch reconnaissance elements late, unrehearsed, and under-resourced. Reconnaissance forces are given little guidance and are expected to quickly cover the entire enemy defense.

How Can We Improve Our Chances for Success?

Conducting successful TF R&S for the deliberate attack is difficult. Nevertheless, R&S planning must be detailed and specific. To simplify plan development, TF S2s should use a phasing technique. Phasing the requirements and tasks makes it easier to plan, coordinate, and manage the mission.

A phased plan ensures R&S assets are scheduled, resourced, and rehearsed to support event-driven information requirements. The plan is based on the general tasks required to collect the information, and is used to program the planning and execution of reconnaissance phases. This technique simplifies your planning and coordination, gives you flexibility, and can be refined as the mission progresses.

When Does R&S Planning Begin? (When Do We Send out the Scouts?)

R&S planning begins when the TF staff completes a mission analysis. By then the S2 section has completed the initial IPB, and, with the commander, has identified initial PIR. We can plan and execute some reconnaissance based on our initial questions on the enemy situation. However, before we can allocate our assets and concentrate on detailed reconnaissance, we must wait until the commander chooses the COA that the TF will execute.

How Do We Plan the R&S Mission?

Following is a 10-step procedure for planning an R&S mission.

1. Develop the Concept (Phase the Plan).

a. To get the information needed to support any deliberate attack, we must perform four critical actions:

(1) **Gain observation of the enemy.** Usually, the TF cannot observe the enemy defense and initially must take action to gain visual contact.

(2) **Maintain observation of the enemy.** This is critical in developing an understanding of the enemy and the changes in the enemy situation.

(3) **Collect detailed information on the enemy defense.** This involves transforming the expected enemy COA into the known enemy situation. This step is critical to the mission's success. The intelligence developed at this stage will

support the commander's confirmation or adjustment of the attack plan.

(4) Observe for reactions to the attack. Watch for key indicators that will facilitate predictive analysis during the fight.

b. The R&S concept is derived from the above tasks. The phases named below are tasks the reconnaissance forces will conduct.

(1) Phase I. Initial reconnaissance and insertion of dismounted observation posts (OPs).

(2) Phase II. Activation of OPs.

(3) Phase III. Detailed reconnaissance of enemy defensive positions and insertion of additional OPs.

(4) Phase IV. Surveillance of the battlefield.

c. Those phases are integrated into the TF schedule, based specifically on when the information is required and the operation's sequence of events. The following example is for a mission whose order was received from higher headquarters at 031200. The attack was to begin at 050600.

(1) Phase I. Initial reconnaissance and insertion of OPs (03EENT until 04BMNT).

(2) Phase II. OPs observe the enemy (04BMNT until 04EENT).

(3) Phase III. Detailed reconnaissance of the defense and objective (04EENT until LD-1 hour).

(4) Phase IV. Mounted and dismounted OPs observe (LD-1 hour until relieved).

2. Issue a Warning Order to Reconnaissance Assets. Give the scout platoon leader and any other elements tasked in Phases I and II all the information you can, as early as possible. This will help them plan and prepare for the operations. Tell the scout platoon leader when he must come to the tactical operations center to get the order and to coordinate his plan.

3. Develop Phases I and II.

a. Given personnel and time constraints, the TF S2 should develop specific orders and requests and specific information requirements to focus the commander's PIR/IR.

b. Determine locations of required OPs.

c. Determine patrol requirements (mounted and dismounted).

d. Task the mission: develop the R&S overlay, R&S tasking matrix, and written instructions. Clearly define what you want collected and when you want it collected.

Note: The scout platoon leader must plan to be available throughout the operation. He is critical to the planning phase and the command and control of subsequent phases. He should not remain for-

ward with one of the OPs during Phase II.

4. Issue the Orders for Phases I and II. Representatives of all elements tasked must be present. This will help everyone understand the operation, and it will facilitate coordination.

5. Execute Phase I. While the scout platoon inserts the OPs, the TF staff continues the planning process. The commander selects the COA that the TF will execute. This is the first opportunity to focus reconnaissance on a specific area of the enemy defense.

6. Develop Phase III, Monitor Phase I.

a. Identify PIR and information requirements (IR).

b. Determine patrol requirements (mounted and dismounted).

c. Consider augmenting the scouts with engineers and a forward observer for Phases III and IV.

d. Plan contingencies for unexpected losses. Another element will have to assume the scout platoon's mission if they're not available.

e. Task the mission: develop the initial R&S overlay, tasking matrix, and instructions for Phase III.

7. Monitor Phase II, Refine Phase III. As reports are monitored from Phase II, refinements to the initial plan may be required. Refinement is based on intelligence gaps or loss of assets. Build redundancy into the plan to ensure critical information is collected.

8. Issue Phases III and IV Orders.

a. Facilitate the coordination between elements conducting the mission and members of the staff.

b. Have elements backbrief the TF S2 or S3 on their plans before they leave the tactical operations center.

9. Execute Phase II.

10. Execute Phase IV.

Summary

Phased R&S plans concentrate on when PIR can and need to be satisfied. The effectiveness of your reconnaissance will improve when you use a phased technique to develop the R&S plan. R&S will be easier to plan, coordinate, and manage, and the R&S operation itself will be more flexible. The TF can use the initial reconnaissance to cue subsequent phases and to focus on intelligence gaps and specific information requirements.

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Warrior: The Future Intelligence Picture--NOW

by Major Alan Norris and
Chief Warrant Officer 2 Kenneth Reese

What the division and brigade commanders of today's Army need most from their intelligence officers is an accurate and timely read of the enemy situation. As fighting vehicles and munitions delivery systems evolve, the pace of the battlefield increases. Today's Army uses sophisticated monitoring equipment at corps and echelons above corps levels to track the battle and to push the results of this intelligence collection down. Historically, this level of sophistication ends at division, where information is transferred by hand to a map.

The Warrior system changes all this. Warrior has become the "trigger" for a new epoch in automated intelligence processing within the U.S. Army. The integration of this new intelligence processing system began during exercise Central Fortress '92, was expanded upon and validated during Reforger '92, and was refined and accepted by the 3d Infantry Division (ID) during its Battle Commanders Training Program (BCTP) Warfighter '93.

What is Warrior?

Warrior is a powerful minicomputer that has completely changed the way analytical processing is done at the tactical level. Warrior gives the division the ability to "machine read" intelligence reports from various sources. It eliminates the need to retype reports into a computer and to manually post the resultant data on a situation map.

The Warrior computer uses UNIX-based software to drive the **Windows** by which all information and reports can be accessed and displayed. Memory consists of 32 MB of RAM coupled to two removable 1.2 GB hard drives. An almost limitless number of active data bases ranging from electronic intelligence to secondary imagery files can be accessed and displayed as annotated pictures. Individual files can be transmitted and received through various communications means by using a powerful communications package.

Warrior can interface with communications links ranging from tactical telephones to dedicated commercial telephone lines encrypted with a simple STU-III. Incoming messages are automatically separated into their respective data bases and then easily retrieved by source, time, or type of activity. The computer can operate in the stand-alone mode

or be set up in a local area network (LAN) creating a multidiscipline intelligence analysis cell. There, analysts can manipulate the same data-based information from any position within the LAN, easily transferring files for hard-copy printout or dissemination to an intelligence consumer. Warrior is configured in two hardened TEMPEST cases that provide fairly good protection.

What Can Warrior Do?

The 3d ID's introduction to Warrior came during Exercise Central Fortress '92 in July. The Warrior system was set up in the division G2's All-Source Production Section (ASPS) in a LAN, and received a direct feed from the Tactical Simulation Model (TACSIM). This simulation feed produced thousands of intelligence reports which inundated ASPS analysts with a much higher level of information than previously experienced. The system was new, the analysts were untrained, and everyone was skeptical. How could a system that easily separates and stores large volumes of data be used most effectively to support the division commander?

ASPS analysts accepted this challenge, and with the help of contract personnel, began to piece together an automated intelligence view of the battlefield. By the end of the exercise, we had gotten a hint of the system's capabilities. We were also able to identify some limitations that stemmed from the fact that it was a new piece of equipment that was going to change the entire 3d ID intelligence process and architecture.

Some of Warrior's capabilities we noted first were—


- ☐ Historically tracking enemy units.
- ☐ Situation Development.
- ☐ Targeting.

Some of our limitations in using Warrior were—

- ☐ Lack of trained personnel.
- ☐ Limited knowledge of how to fully use the system.
- ☐ Securing data quality communications circuits.
- ☐ An uninterrupted power supply in a tactical environment.

Validation

The 3d ID validated the Warrior system during Reforger '92 in September. Through this three-



week exercise, our use of Warrior expanded to become an effective combat intelligence processing system. As in exercise Central Fortress, information came directly by TACSIM feed. However, unlike Central Fortress, we expanded our configuration from a simple LAN (within the division), to a Wide Area Network (WAN) that incorporated V Corps, Central Army Group, and even the Trojan switch at Fort Belvoir, VA. (See figure above.) This was accomplished using the Trojan Spirit Communications System. Files could now be transferred and accessed between a much wider group of users. We were able to increase the amount of information accessible exponentially by the number of division analysts.

To make the system even more effective, simulated national-level intelligence data was entered into Warrior by a FAST-I (forward area secondary imagery dissemination/tactical related application [SID/TRAP]-Improved). This again increased the amount of intelligence information flowing into the division. This quantity of input could only have been matched by the information flow during an actual conflict. Warrior had no difficulty separating and storing the larger amounts of data. Based on experience from Central Fortress, our analysts were able to manipulate the intelligence data bases not only to track the battlefield situation, but also to produce reports and graphic displays. These were disseminated to the aviation brigade and division

fire support element (FSE) to support air strikes and suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD).

The "working" situation map of ASPS was systematically transferred to a graphics display on the Warrior system. Maps were still used to paint the picture for the division, but we had successfully moved our analytical effort to electronic media. Our command group was intimately involved in this evolution. When the decision makers wanted the most current intelligence and warning information, they asked, "What's on Warrior?"

We also took the first step in bringing this automated intelligence picture to our major subordinate units. Warrior systems were incorporated into the S2 sections of the three maneuver brigades during Reformer '92. Intelligence information was transferred to the brigades through a Warrior system located in the division collection management and dissemination (CM&D) section via tactical telephone links. The information transferred to the brigades gave them the same picture of the battlefield as the corps and division G2. **We had achieved a seamless intelligence architecture.**

Data was disseminated through a procedure known as "Air Gap." This is a DIA-approved procedure to transfer data from an automation system accredited to process sensitive compartmented information (SCI) into one accredited to process at a lower classification level. A Warrior workstation in the ASPS was tasked to download intelligence data

bases to a floppy disk. From the disk, the information could be transferred to a Warrior workstation that processed information at the lower classification level. The disk was then hand-carried outside the SCIF area for Warrior-to-Warrior data dissemination.

The Warrior workstation outside the SCIF was located in the CM&D section. This Warrior was linked into the Multisubscriber Element (MSE) tactical communications network via a Digital Nonsecure Voice Terminal (DNVT). The Warrior workstations at maneuver brigades were likewise configured. To transmit files, a Warrior operator in the CM&D would contact the subordinate commands via DNVT, and transmit updated intelligence data bases. This occurred at a minimum of once every six hours, or more often if activity warranted. This procedure enabled us to rapidly deliver processed intelligence to the brigade commander.

The problems the brigades had were similar to those the division ASPS had during Central Fortress: lack of trained personnel; lack of room for the Warrior equipment; and a new twist in the division, communication links.

The problems noted with Warrior communications in the division were twofold—synchronization and dissemination:

1. Synchronization. MSE was used in all communications between the G2 CM&D Warrior and the subordinate brigade Warriors. Data files were transferred using the Warrior communications protocol software—KERMIT. When used with the Warrior system, KERMIT uses an asynchronous data circuit. MSE incorporates synchronous data communications. Therefore, synchronization between the two different data flow configurations caused problems.

2. Dissemination. The second problem was noted during Reforger '92. Warrior data files could be transferred using MSE between Warrior systems established within the same MSE communications node. If the routinely communicating Warrior systems had to use a number of MSE communication nodes to complete the data circuit, transfer of data files often failed. This resulted in a backlog of messages of up to two hours. For the first time a seamless intelligence architecture was in place but, ironically, the lack of timely dissemination reduced its effectiveness.

Refinement

The Warrior system was accepted as an integral part of the division's intelligence architecture during our BCTP Warfighter in January 1993. Warrior received Battlefield Intelligence Collection

Model (BICM) information directly from the local simulation center. Although this information flow was at a somewhat lower level than that received from TACSIM during Reforger, it was sufficient to stress the system. This information was separated into data bases and used to keep an updated battle map and to support air strikes and SEAD.

Our analysts were now comfortable manipulating and accessing various data bases. They could quickly access and display information from several intelligence disciplines simultaneously. They could cross-queue information and verify unit locations, making analytical battlefield assessments with only a few clicks of the mouse. This capability allowed them to portray an accurate enemy situation across the entire battlefield. The most current and detailed situation map became the graphics display on the Warrior system. Now it was time to refine our Warrior methodology.

We refined the Warrior system to serve as an indications and warning workstation before and during the division's close fight. By dedicating one analyst and one position to nothing but tracking the developments of the ongoing battle, ASPS could watch the movements of the enemy and make accurate assessments about his intentions. By cross-queueing three or four intelligence data bases simultaneously and sorting the incoming information by time, the analyst could see enemy movement as it occurred. He could get additional information by tasking a second Warrior position to search for information in other data bases or geographic locations.

A third Warrior workstation was dedicated to monitoring and reporting current air defense artillery (ADA) activity in the division's sector. Acquisition and fire control radar information and locations were immediately reported to the aviation brigade and (if in striking range) to the FSE for SEAD. This proved to be very effective. The FSE was able to target 85 percent of enemy air defense within the division's sector (a resounding success for the FSE during our BCTP). This data-base information was also used to graphically depict the ADA system ranges for aviation brigade deep strikes and cross-FLOT (forward line of own troops) operations. By adding ADA system range information into the graphic display parameters, analysts created a color graphic representation of enemy ADA coverage. Thus, they could determine areas of possible weakness or vulnerability. (See photo of printout next page.)

The fourth ASPS Warrior workstation was dedicated to receiving the BICM message feed via a



STU-III and commercial telephone lines. Once established, this phone link remained operational with no message loss for the entire exercise. During the exercise, the BICM processor produced more than 10,000 intelligence messages, which Warrior easily processed.

Dissemination

Dissemination is a critical component of any tactical operations center. Getting detailed intelligence information to a maneuver brigade's S2 section is frequently impossible. During 3d ID's Warfighter, all three maneuver brigades, as well as the cavalry squadron and combat aviation brigade, were equipped with Warrior systems.

Although using the MSE tactical communications network for dissemination in the division was better than it was during Reforger '92, it still had problems. The backlog of disseminated information peaked at approximately two hours during one point in the exercise—an unacceptable time delay in a division close fight. We came up with two possible solutions to this dilemma:

1. It became clear that only one person (such as the senior mission manager) should set dissemination priorities. Instead of trying to transmit everything all the time, the mission manager should track the current situation and establish dissemination priorities. If critical information needed to be disseminated, then this data would be elevated to a higher priority and disseminated first. All other information (especially routine data file transfers) would slip to a lower priority. In this way, the most critical intelligence information would have been disseminated in a timely manner, even though a routine data file transfer could be bumped until it became useless to the tactical commander.

2. The second possible solution is a concept known as "Packet Switching," whereby the Warrior system is connected to the MSE tactical communications network directly establishing an MSE-based WAN. This would enable many data base transfers by several Warrior systems simultaneously and take pressure off the CM&D Warrior.

(Continued on page 40)



SHOOT TO KILL:

A LIC DISASTER IN NORTHERN IRELAND

By Captain Nicholas J. Eckert

*I was born under a Union Jack.
I was born under a Union Jack.
If guns were made for shooting,
then skulls were made to crack.
I've never seen a better (Catholic)
than with a bullet in his back."*

*—An Anonymous Protestant Song
from Ulster*

During two incidents in late 1982, in a rural part of Northern Ireland, police shot dead three members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and a 17-year-old civilian bystander. The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), Northern Ireland's police force, claimed the shootings were unconnected events initiated by PIRA terrorists. Despite reassuring government explanations, investigators from the British police and media discovered a link between the killings. Eventually, some investigators came to believe the police shot the four men in retaliation for an earlier murder of three RUC officers.

After examining the background of the case, the sequence of events, and specific aspects of both

*Eventually, some investigators
came to believe the police shot
the four men in retaliation.*

shootings, we can see the police committed a classic mistake for any counterterrorist effort. They became emotionally involved in what they were doing. This error led a small clique of RUC officers to commit revenge murder.

A Violent History

Most of the violence in Ulster (the provincial name for Northern Ireland) occurs in Londonderry and Belfast. However, the PIRA has always maintained a significant presence in the border counties of Armagh and Fermanagh. When the British tightened security in Ulster's cities, the PIRA's rural campaign became increasingly important. By the early 1980's, the British soldiers and police stationed in the border counties faced an elusive enemy that rarely stood and fought. The PIRA preferred to smuggle guns and explosives across the border from the Republic of Ireland, snipe at patrols, and mine roads used by the security forces.

Frustrated by their failure to deal with PIRA terrorists, the RUCs became more willing to conduct undercover, paramilitary operations against the PIRA.¹

The British government could not ignore the "shoot to kill" allegation.

On October 27, 1982, three RUC officers died when their car detonated a land mine in Kinnego, Armagh. Two more tragedies quickly followed:

- On November 11, 1982, the RUCs shot and killed three members of the PIRA: Sean Burns, Gervaise McKerr, and Eugene Toman. The RUCs reported that the shooting began after the gunmen ran their car through a routine vehicle checkpoint. The RUCs gave chase and started shooting after they thought the PIRA had fired on them. All three terrorists killed were unarmed.²
- On November 24, 1982, RUC officers killed Michael Tighe, a 17-year-old with no connection to terrorism. In the same incident, they badly wounded Martin McCauley, an alleged PIRA operative. A police spokesman stated that a routine patrol encountered the two men in a hay shed on a farm near Kinnego. Despite two warnings, Tighe and McCauley refused to come out of the shed. The RUCs opened fire when the suspects aimed rifles at them.³

These four deaths touched off an enormous controversy in Ulster, the Republic of Ireland, and the United Kingdom. The reason for the outcry was simple. The RUC had a history of dealing brutally with terrorist suspects. The PIRA had long maintained the police had a "shoot to kill" policy when confronting Republican militants. When the police version of the shootings did not match information available to the public, Ulster's Catholics began to believe the PIRA's accusations.

The British government could not ignore the "shoot to kill" allegation. It had spent years building the RUC up as a modern, impartial police agency. Simultaneously, it conducted a psychological operation against the PIRA, portraying the terrorists as psychopaths and criminals. Claims of summary executions conducted by police could permanently damage this strategy. To settle (some say whitewash) the controversy, the British Home Office decided to investigate the killings. It appointed John Stalker, the Deputy Chief Constable of the Manchester Police Force, to conduct the inquiry.

Stalker investigated the case from May 1984 until his abrupt removal in May 1986. Today, mem-

bers of the British media are still investigating the circumstances of the incidents and Stalker's dismissal. These successive probes uncovered four very disturbing aspects of the case. Taken together, they cast a strong shadow of suspicion on the RUC.

RUC Resistance to Stalker

The first troubling factor was the RUC reaction to Stalker. Their hostility went beyond any normal resentment of an internal affairs investigation. The British detective felt the RUC hierarchy expected to be absolved of any wrongdoing. They regarded any effort to examine police operations as naive meddling. In addition, the RUCs bitterly opposed Stalker's efforts to interview fringe members of the PIRA about the four dead men. At one point, a RUC officer told Stalker: "A senior police officer of your rank should not be seen talking to (PIRA suspects).... You have embarrassed all of us in doing that. I will be reporting this conversation and what you have done to my superiors."⁴

Besides a general hostility, Stalker encountered a clique of officers in the RUC Special Branch, the police unit that deals with terrorist crimes. The clique's power amazed Stalker. Its members could and did give orders to senior RUC officials. The Special Branch men determined what made a citizen of Ulster a terrorist suspect. More importantly, they could conduct unsupervised undercover operations against terrorist groups.

In Stalker's eyes, the Special Branch clique did its best to keep critical intelligence files from him. Special Branch superintendents tried to keep him from interviewing officers involved in the shootings. Overall, Stalker felt: "Virtually from day one some senior Special Branch officers tried unsuccessfully to insist we had to tell them why we wanted information before they agreed to see us let alone give us what we wanted."⁵

At one point during Stalker's confrontation with the Special Branch, an unknown RUC officer warned him that his enemies had tapped his phone.⁶

Their hostility went beyond any normal resentment of an internal affairs investigation.

A Suspicious "Investigation"

The second disturbing part of the case was the way the RUC conducted its own investigation of the two shootings. RUC detectives had done a remarkably poor job probing the circumstances of the four deaths. They failed to preserve the crime scenes.



They allowed evidence to "vanish."

They took inadequate photographs

of the areas of the shootings. In addition to these serious investigative "mistakes," an even more critical error occurred. RUC regulations require officers who discharge their weapons to stay in the area of the shooting so investigators can interview them. This did not occur. In each incident, Special Branch officers ordered the men to return to their barracks with their firearms.⁷

Stalker thought the poor quality inquiry was suspicious. The RUC detectives had a justified reputation for conducting very thorough investigations. The blunders he found did not make sense unless they were deliberate. Under this line of reasoning, the RUCs made willful errors because they feared what a real probe would reveal.

The True Version of Events

The third alarming factor, the actual circumstances of the shootings, damned the RUCs as cold-blooded murderers to many people in Ulster. Despite resistance from the Special Branch, Stalker eventually questioned the officers that shot the four men. From these interviews and other sources he discovered these links between the two incidents:

- ☐ The RUC officers involved were not ordinary policemen. Instead, they belonged to an elite Special Branch paramilitary squad trained by the British Special Air Service.⁸
- ☐ Neither event was a chance encounter. In the first incident, the Special Branch watched Burns, McKerr, and Toman for hours before the shooting began. In the second incident, the British Security Service had bugged the hay shed. It maintained electronic surveillance of the site for several weeks before Tighe died there.⁹
- ☐ In both cases, high ranking Special Branch officials ordered their paramilitaries to lie about the circumstances of the killings. They told the offi-

cers this was necessary to protect informants.¹⁰

Using information obtained from members of the RUC paramilitary squad and other sources, Stalker reconstructed the actual sequence of events leading up to the shootings.

Shortly after the RUC officers died in Kinnego, an informant contacted the Special Branch office in Armagh. He told the officers that Burns, McKerr, and Toman were responsible for the explosion. In addition, he told the Special Branch that the land mine came from the hay shed where Tighe later died. On November 10, 1982, the Special Branch began following the trio of PIRA men.

On November 11, 1982, the RUC paramilitary squad intercepted them. The squad made no attempt to arrest the gunmen. Its members fired over 108 rounds into the PIRA car, killing everyone in it. Events then shifted to the hay shed. After learning that the building was a PIRA arms cache site, the Special Branch placed it under surveillance. When the Security Service bug detected Tighe and McCauley on November 24, 1982, the paramilitary squad went into action.¹¹

McCauley claimed he and Tighe entered the building because they thought someone had broken into it. Then, according to Stalker: "Without any warning two shots rang out and Tighe disappeared (He had been killed instantly)...a voice said, 'Right, come on out'...before [McCauley] could move he was hit by a burst of gunfire. He shouted [that he would come out] but he could not move.... [There] was another burst of gunfire...policemen entered and he was dragged out. A policeman held a gun to his head and spoke of finishing him off."¹²

The British detective learned the Security Service had a tape recording of the entire incident. If the RUCs had told the truth, the tape would clear them. If not, it would be damning evidence of mur-

der. Despite repeated requests, the Security Service and the RUC did not give him a copy of the recording. Their refusal strongly suggests McCauley told the truth.¹³

The Special Branch was "out of control". . . it condoned the actions of its officers even when they committed serious crimes.

Stalker's Removal

The final disturbing aspect of the case was Stalker's sudden removal. At the time his superiors dismissed him from the inquiry, Stalker had focused on several senior RUC officials. One of these was Sir John Hermon, the RUC's Chief Constable. The detective had planned to interview these men as criminal suspects. At the same time, Stalker's demands for a copy of "the hay shed tape" had become more and more insistent. In addition, he had sharply criticized the way the RUC conducted undercover operations.¹⁴

Initially, Stalker did not know why his superiors removed him from the investigation. He later learned it was because of alleged misconduct. His supervisors accused him of associating with known criminals. After an exhaustive inquiry, the British Police Board cleared Stalker, and he returned to duty on August 23, 1986. He never returned to the investigation in Ulster. Another police official, Colin Sampson, took his place. With his career in ruins, Stalker resigned from the Manchester Police on March 13, 1987.¹⁵

On January 25, 1988, Sir Patrick Mayhew, the British Attorney General, stated there was no evidence the RUC murdered the four men. Despite being cleared by the government, Sir John Hermon demoted and transferred several senior RUC Special Branch officers. This may have been a tacit admission of responsibility on his part.¹⁶

Analysis

After considering these facts, one can come to a very definite conclusion about the RUC Special Branch. It was not a model police agency that impartially upheld the law. Far from it, the Special Branch was "out of control." Even worse, it condoned the actions of its officers even when they committed serious crimes to reach police objectives in Ulster.

In the end, the public will probably never know what happened in Armagh in late 1982. Some of the principals are dead; others will never talk. Nevertheless, when one considers the facts cited above, a scenario comes to mind. After the three

RUC officers died in Kinnego, a group of Special Branch officers decided to "get" the men responsible. Since it is difficult to bring terrorists to trial in Ulster, someone decided that shooting the criminals would be simpler. When the RUC's leaders learned what had happened, they covered up their men's crimes. Stalker's investigation had come too close to the truth. Rather than admit its men committed murder, the RUC forced him out.

The lesson MI professionals can learn from this tragic event is simple: Security forces conducting counterterrorist/insurgent operations cannot become emotionally involved in what they're doing. If this occurs, they will probably overreact to terrorist crimes and provocations. An overreacting security force is likely to retaliate in ways a host nation population will never accept. When this occurred in Armagh the PIRA was the only winner.

Endnotes

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R&S PLANNING: CORNERSTONE TO SUCCESS ON THE BATTLEFIELD



by Captain Brian H. Edholm

Successful reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) planning is a critical function of a Battalion/Task Force (Bn/TF) staff. In spite of its importance, R&S planning has been neglected in current decision-making doctrine. This void has compounded differences in understanding and expectations among the key R&S planning players: the Bn/TF commander, the S3, and the S2.

However, two new field manuals, now in production, will bridge these differences. New decision-making doctrine, emphasizing R&S planning in the initial stages, has been written into the 1994 FM 101-5, **Command and Control for Commanders and Staff**, and FM 34-2, **Collection Management and Synchronization Planning**. Fi-

nally, we have solid doctrine that resolves these issues, rather than having to rely on local tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). This will improve R&S planning Armywide.

What is R&S and Why Do We Do It?

Reconnaissance and surveillance are defined in FM 101-5-1, **Operational Terms and Symbols**:

- ☐ **Reconnaissance** is a mission undertaken to obtain information by visual observation, or other detection methods, about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or about meteorologic, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.
- ☐ **Surveillance** is a systematic observation of airspace or surface area by visual, aural,

electronic, photographic, or other means.

How does R&S relate to IPB and situational templates? R&S is conducted to gather information about the enemy which will confirm, adjust, or deny a given template. How does R&S relate to the commander? It provides him the information about an enemy's capabilities and intentions that enables him to gain or retain the battlefield initiative.

For the purposes of this discussion, R&S planning equals collection planning or collection management. Although the level of detail is different (R&S is conducted at brigade and lower and collection management at division and higher), the same principles apply to both.

Paul Revere's ride from Boston to Lexington to warn the militia of advancing British troops is an example of a simple and effective R&S plan.

How Important is R&S?

History confirms the importance of R&S, dating back to the origins of organized warfare. The U.S. Army (or its precursor) used R&S before the days of the Continental Army. Paul Revere's ride from Boston to Lexington to warn the militia of advancing British troops is an example of a simple and effective R&S plan.

In more recent history, the Rand Corporation attempted to quantify the importance of R&S in its 1987 study, **Applying the National Training Center Experience: Tactical Reconnaissance**. Rand statistics (shown below) clearly support two premises. First, a good R&S mission usually leads to overall mission success, and poor R&S usually precedes

failure. Second, if the battles that were studied reflect Armywide R&S proficiency, R&S planning and execution need improvement.

My experience as a maneuver Bn/TF S2 at the NTC, in April 1992, served to reinforce that good R&S does not just happen. If there isn't a "method to the madness" of gaining information on the battlefield, you will not get the information the commander needs.

When I left the NTC last year, two questions nagged at me: "Why did our R&S missions fail?" and "Why couldn't I (the Bn/TF S2) get our R&S to work?" My old unit isn't the only one having trouble with R&S. So why do we fail so often in a task that is critical to our success on the battlefield?

What Causes R&S Mission Failure?

Tactical reconnaissance at the Bn/TF level is an art which is difficult to master. The slightest mistake in either planning, preparation, or execution can cause a mission to fail. These are just some of the factors that can spell disaster: bad communications, no MEDEVAC or resupply, a poor situation/event template, using only scouts without additional assets, and poor noise and light discipline. With this slim margin for error, it isn't surprising that R&S success eludes many units.

While there are many pitfalls for an R&S mission, it is in the planning phase that the Bn/TF staff has the greatest influence. This phase is also the most important part of the R&S process. If R&S assets are given a poor plan, they will have an uphill battle just to survive.

An example from the NTC of poor R&S planning can be found in Captain Frank J. Abbott's **Red Thrust Star** article "Observations at the NTC": "The TF's R&S plan was not well thought out and was poorly executed. The TF, therefore, crossed the LD with little knowledge of the MRB's actual defensive disposition and strength."³ The article further out-

ATTACK OUTCOME ACCORDING TO RECONNAISSANCE STATUS

	RECONNAISSANCE STATUS		BATTLE OUTCOME					
			SUCCESS		FAILURE		STANDOFF	
	BLUFOR	OPFOR	BLUFOR	OPFOR	BLUFOR	OPFOR	BLUFOR	OPFOR
GOOD	13	28	9	26	1	1	3	1
POOR	50	5	4	0	38	5	8	0
UNCLEAR	14	3	4	2	4	0	6	1

lines how the scout platoon struggled: "One section was unable to observe the enemy's defensive positions and another section was killed by the defending MRB because they blundered into enemy direct fire range."⁴ This is obviously not the standard we are striving for.

Obstacles to Successful R&S Planning

R&S planning is clearly the most critical factor in R&S mission success, and later on, overall mission success. To succeed, maneuver Bn/TF staffs must be proficient in R&S planning. There are two obstacles to good R&S planning:

1. Current doctrine.

Cause: Doctrinally, the decision-making process does not include R&S planning.

Effect: The staff may not conduct R&S planning while executing the decision-making process.

2. Education and training.

Cause: Current military education and training do not bridge the gap between the various levels of understanding and expectations of key R&S planners.

Effect: This can prevent R&S planning from receiving appropriate command emphasis and may preclude the S2 from having the authority to task R&S assets.

R&S Planning in Current Tactical Decision-Making Doctrine

The staff planning process is a systematic approach to preparing plans and orders. It incorporates—

- ☐ Troop leading procedures.
- ☐ Planning sequence requirements (including staff estimates).
- ☐ Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).
- ☐ The military decision-making process.
- ☐ The METT-T factors (mission, enemy, time, terrain, and troops).

Of the five elements of the staff planning process, IPB and the decision-making process are the focal point of a Bn/TF staff orders drill. Together, they outline the process a Bn/TF staff should use to create an operations order.

Chapter Five of the 1985 FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*, outlines the decision-making process. What the chapter fails to highlight, though, is R&S planning as a step in, or the R&S plan as a product of, the decision-making process. One could assume R&S planning is included in the "Prepare Intelligence Plans and Intelligence Portions of Operations Order" step.⁵ If that is the case, the emphasis on R&S planning

falls seriously short of its magnitude.

The 1989 FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, outlines the IPB effort in support of an orders drill. It contains a diagram of the decision-making process from the 1985 FM 101-5,⁶ supported by IPB.⁷ In doing this, the R&S plan isn't mentioned as a product of the IPB/decision-making process. In fact, the event template isn't mentioned in the diagram either, even though it is a critical IPB product and drives the R&S plan and the decision support template. Isn't it ironic that the doctrinal focal points of creating an order fail to emphasize a critical step—R&S planning—that directly influences the success of that order.

Why More R&S Doctrinal Emphasis Is Needed

ARTEP 71-2-MTP, *Mission Training Plan for the Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force*, is an example of the doctrinal emphasis placed on R&S planning: "If more time is available, fully developed OPORD is issued. Elements include: critical intelligence reporting and collection requirements."⁸

How many commanders and S3s will make the time during an ARTEP to incorporate collection requirements (the R&S plan) into their order if it is optional? If R&S planning isn't a priority in doctrine, how can we expect it to be a priority in training? If R&S planning isn't trained in peace, it will be very costly to learn in combat.

Current decision-making doctrine does not state when and where the R&S plan should be done. If R&S is ignored in this process, the staff is more likely to ignore it as well; especially, since decision-making doctrine drives the staff orders effort. Obviously, the decision-making process needed to be modified because this guidance is needed, but is missed.

Emphasis on R&S in Emerging Doctrine

It is encouraging to see that the new draft FM 101-5 includes the collection plan (the R&S plan) as a product of IPB and the decision-making process (see Tab A).⁹ This should prompt Bn/TF commanders and S3s to emphasize R&S planning since now it is clearly part of the decision-making process. As we will see later, it should also prompt the commander to better support the S2 in his effort to produce the R&S plan.

The new draft FM 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, incorporates the collection plan (R&S plan) as a specific product produced by the G2/S2 and designed to support the tactical decision-making process.¹⁰ This should

force the Bn/TF S2s to do an R&S plan properly and timely. It also gives the S2 the doctrinal authority to get the rest of the staff involved in R&S planning.

Improving New Decision-Making Doctrine

Finally, the new decision-making doctrine stresses the R&S plan as an important and separate product required during the decision-making process. Now we can develop TTP to improve on its uses by incorporating the cyclic nature of the intelligence cycle.

The new draft **FM 34-2, Collection Management and Synchronization Planning**, associates collection management with the decision-making process in Chapter 2. Speaking of the Mission Analysis step in the decision-making process, **FM 34-2** further states: "The collection manager uses this initial event template (based on situation templates produced during mission analysis) (see Tab A) to focus collection on identifying the course of action (COA) adopted by the threat."¹¹ It is then possible to execute a quick and simple R&S plan after the warning order is issued. This would provide the most current and accurate input to the decision-making process: for example, which COA has the enemy adopted. A more specific R&S plan would be produced later in the decision-making process, but the staff could have already taken advantage of the dynamic aspects of the intelligence cycle before completing the order.

Another possibility could be to use a previous R&S plan and its results as input to the Mission Analysis step. In either case, the result is a better overall plan. An example of how these modifications might appear as part of the deliberate decision-making process can be found in Tab B. The bold blocks highlight changes or additions to the chart (Tab A) in the new draft **FM 101-5**.

Who Should Be Responsible?

Now that we have established the R&S plan's rightful place in doctrine, who should lead the effort to make the R&S plan? As a maneuver S2, I found that the responsibility wasn't clearly mine. Because of maneuver missions the scouts had to perform, the S3 felt he should plan the R&S mission. When I wanted the scouts to cover specific named areas of interest, the S3 wanted to screen the TF flank. This caused confusion and complications when we were forced to conduct a complete planning cycle at the NTC.

Unfortunately, we didn't discover this before we went to the NTC because the R&S plan was never

a staff priority during our orders drills in garrison. This is another example of the lack of emphasis on R&S begun in doctrine and continued in training.

Had the S3 and I referred to doctrine to identify who should do the R&S planning, we would have found this: "At brigade or battalion, you (the S2) are the driving force in the R&S effort..." and "...the S3 makes sure the assets are available and can conduct the mission and the R&S plan supports the overall mission of the unit..."¹² and "...reconnaissance and surveillance operations are planned by the S2 and coordinated with the S3 to confirm or deny the S2's templating."¹³

On the way home from the NTC rotation, we could have read this in our take-home packet: "The S2 must develop an R&S plan that includes all available assets and focuses on the objective."

This was hard to accomplish because, as the S2, I had the responsibility for R&S without the authority to task assets. If all I needed was the S3's approval, I could have managed. Instead, my R&S plan contradicted the S3's maneuver plan because his plan for R&S assets wasn't tied into the IPB that should have driven the R&S plan.


S2s Must Have the Authority with the Responsibility

This is where the commander's understanding of IPB and R&S planning affects the whole process. The commander needs to understand that the process of **IPB directing the R&S plan (and, therefore, R&S assets)** is the best means to get him the answers to his critical questions. It is not the end on which to base his plan. **FM 71-123, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion/Task Force, and Company/Team**, summarizes this point well: "NOTE: IPB is a useful aid to planning. There is a tendency, however, to believe the assumptions made in IPB are in fact true and to develop plans accordingly. This is dangerous because it could make friendly forces susceptible to surprise by the enemy. Commanders and staff must be aware of this possibility. They must develop plans to prevent the command from being surprised by unexpected enemy actions."¹⁴

The plans that prevent the command from being surprised are R&S plans. S2s need to create them within the staff's decision-making process. If the S2 has done his job, his R&S plan will support the commander's intelligence needs. Then the S3 should dedicate what assets he can to the R&S effort and make sure the R&S plan fits the overall scheme of maneuver. If the S2 cannot provide this type of R&S product, he either needs

TAB A

DELIBERATE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS




TAB B

DELIBERATE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

PRODUCTS IN

PHASES

PRODUCTS OUT



more training or needs to be replaced. There is no room for an S2 who cannot perform what is arguably his most important wartime task: R&S planning.

Why the Difficulties?

Why do battalion commanders, S3s, and S2s have difficulty conducting R&S planning? Listed below are some of the reasons:

- ☐ The R&S plan is omitted during garrison staff drills. In other words, staff drills are not done properly.
- ☐ Battalion commanders and S3s do not receive the same instruction as the S2 during their military education in IPB and R&S planning.
- ☐ Battalion S2s do not get adequate training in how to use maneuver R&S assets found at Bn/TF level.

Battalion commanders get one to two hours of IPB (not specifically R&S planning) instruction in their pre-command course (Infantry and Armor). Battalion S3s are taught collection management at the Command and General Staff College. However, the focus is primarily at division and corps and lacks the level of detail required at Bn/TF level.

At MIOAC, battalion S2s get 144 hours of instruction and practical exercises on brigade-level planning. This includes two practical exercises dedicated to R&S planning at brigade and Bn/TF levels. Although these exercises focus on R&S planning, little is mentioned about maneuver R&S asset employment and their tactics. The combined result is ill-prepared commanders, S2s, and S3s:

- ☐ Commanders and S3s who have only general knowledge of IPB at the Bn/TF level.
- ☐ S2s who do not have specific knowledge of maneuver R&S assets and the tactics of their use.

How Can This Be Corrected?

Maneuver Bn/TF commanders and S3s must educate themselves in the entire IPB process, especially in R&S planning. The division G2 can aid this process by conducting professional development sessions designed to get the commanders, S3s, and S2s to a common level of understanding and expectation in the IPB/R&S planning area.

Bn/TF S2s must educate themselves in the TTP that maneuver R&S assets use. Documents such as FM 17-98, *The Scout Platoon*, and FM 17-95, *Cavalry Operations*, are good places to start. Additionally, S2s should attend the Scout Platoon Leader's Course at the Armor School. This would be especially beneficial for MIOBC and MIOAC graduates who are being assigned to maneuver

units.

Conclusion

In previous decision-making doctrine, the place and timing of the R&S plan was not well defined. This resulted in training that didn't include R&S in the staff planning process. With the benefit of new, more precise doctrine, Bn/TF staffs will become more proficient in R&S planning.

Because of differences in the military education and experience of key R&S planning players, an effort must be made to improve their professional knowledge in key areas identified earlier. This effort begins with the individual and should be nurtured by the unit (perhaps through officer professional development-type sessions). It would also enhance the military education of R&S planning players if the three branch schools involved—Infantry, Armor, and MI—improved and expanded their training. These schools (and others, if needed) must emphasize R&S planning, IPB, and the decision-making process equally.

With the help of new decision-making doctrine, all R&S planning players can reach a common level of knowledge and understanding of the R&S process. When this happens, mission success will improve greatly, because of the importance R&S holds in mission success.

Endnotes

1. Martin Goldsmith, *Applying the National Training Center Experience: Tactical Reconnaissance* (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1987), 9.
2. Ibid.
3. CPT Frank J. Abbott, "Observations at the NTC," *Red Thrust Star*, PB 30-90-1, 14-17.
4. Ibid., 15-16.
5. FM 101-5, *Staff Organizations and Operations*, 1985, 5-7.
6. Ibid., 5-6.
7. FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, 1989, 3-3.
8. ARTEP 71-2-MTP, *Mission Training Plan for the Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force*, 1988, 5-95.
9. Draft FM 101-5, *Command and Control for Commanders and Staff*, TBP 1994, Figure 5-8.
10. Draft FM 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, TBP 1994, 3-10.
11. Draft FM 34-2, *Collection Management and Synchronization Planning*, 1994, 2-1.
12. FM 34-2-1, *TTP for Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counter-Reconnaissance*, 1991, 4-1, 4-3.
13. FM 71-2, *The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force*, 1988, 3-19.
14. FM 71-123, *TTP for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion/Task Force and Company/Team*, 1992, 1-26.

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Debriefing the Reconnaissance Team

by Master Sergeant Carl G. Wells

When a patrol or reconnaissance team (RT) returns from its mission, the first priority after medical care is a thorough debriefing of its members. All too often, the importance of this final step in the execution of a reconnaissance mission has a very low priority or is overlooked entirely.

Why Debrief?

A patrol or RT should be debriefed immediately after it returns from a mission to amplify and analyze the reporting it did during the actual mission. Beyond that, a debriefing can—

- ☐ Bring out unreported details that when collated with other information could alter the picture of the enemy situation.
- ☐ Lead to the location of downed or missing friendly aircraft.
- ☐ Highlight shortcomings in pre-mission planning or unit SOPs.
- ☐ Help reconstruct the mission if casualties are sustained—either to recover remains or to determine KIA, MIA, or PW status.
- ☐ Provide a historical record of the mission for post-hostilities analysis.
- ☐ Be used to develop a data base on how reconnaissance was conducted during a particular campaign.

The full benefits of debriefing can only be realized if an organization places a high priority on it. Simply putting a debriefing requirement into the unit SCP is not enough. This puts debriefing into the category of "it's in the SOP," so it's just another block to check off when the patrol or RT returns. If the organization puts a low priority on debriefing, it tends to assign inexperienced analysts as debriefers, with little knowledge of reconnaissance, the specific mission, and debriefing skills.

Usually, these young soldiers know little about reconnaissance beyond what they learned in basic training, and often are further handicapped by being junior to those being debriefed. (This may not be true for more conventional units, who don't cross the FLOT in their patrols.) Sending in an inexperienced soldier to debrief a patrol or RT can cause resentment on the part of patrol members who may feel they're not being taken seriously. The debriefer must know reconnaissance, be familiar

with the specific mission, and be sufficiently senior in rank to **control and guide** the debriefing session. This task requires maturity and experience.

Consider the Team's Condition

The most critical factor in preparing a debrief is the condition of the patrol or RT. A Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) RT which has been compromised during the mission and has wounded and missing members is approached and handled much differently than a local security patrol.

A returning LRRP RT should be handled with great care. Debriefers should provide not only the facility in which to conduct the debrief, but also quick-energy food such as fruit or desserts and coffee (for the caffeine) or juice. RT members in a deep penetration role have not been able to consume enough food and water, being limited to what they can carry. These soldiers have been operating on adrenaline because of the intense stress. When they return, they are physically exhausted. When the adrenaline wears off they will need sugar and caffeine to sustain them during the debriefing.

When there has been an extended mission, a debrief can last as long as two or three hours. This is exactly when the adrenaline "high" wears off. During a debriefing in Saudi Arabia during Desert Storm, a soldier taking part in the debrief finished answering a question and fell out of his chair asleep within seconds. He finished the debriefing on his feet while eating MRE instant-coffee powder.

Debriefing local security patrols is handled differently. They have been out for a shorter period of time and probably have not been in unsupported contact with the enemy. They don't require the specialized provisions LRRP members do. Debriefers do need to provide them with ice water, hot soup, or coffee, and a sheltered place to conduct the debrief.

Consider the Team's Feelings

A major consideration in any debrief is whether or not the patrol has sustained losses, either killed, wounded, or missing. Not since the Vietnam Conflict, over a generation ago, has a partial recovery of a deployed RT been accomplished. Clearly, in future conflict, the nature of war dictates that such losses will occur. In addition to being exhausted,

the RT will be angry, depressed, and emotionally overwhelmed. The debriefer must be prepared to deal with this.

The debriefer should be aided by a psychologist, psychiatrist, or chaplain with grief counselling experience. If the mental health professional or chaplain is a stranger to the traumatized patrol, the soldiers will not "open up" in his presence. Units that conduct deep penetration reconnaissance should have access to a trained professional who knows the organization and its members.

After such an experience, the debriefing process itself is part of the healing process. The FBI, Secret Service, and other government agencies have begun to provide support systems for their agents and operatives after "violent intrapersonal confrontations" (read fire-fight). Military units, which are formed into crews, teams, squads, and platoons, actually help this process because they provide the small cohesive units soldiers need to identify with.

Military mental health professionals use a technique called event reconstruction. Used in the Gulf War, event reconstruction is a process in which the participants verbally walk through the events leading up to, during, and after the trauma. Reconstruction helps survivors bring the trauma into focus and validates their memories of it. Event reconstruction is a debriefing. Surely, this reinforces the contention that debriefing is critical to the welfare of the soldiers involved.

The Physical Layout

The physical setting is important. Debriefers should set aside a sheltered, identified area, away from ongoing operations. A conference room or a tent is best since it often has the proper equipment. A debriefing area requires map boards, chairs, and tables. The maps used for the mission planning and execution should be available. In lieu of that, debriefers can use a situation map showing the situation at the time of insertion. If possible, the imagery used in mission planning should be available also.

There should be enough chairs for everyone involved in the debriefing to sit down. Personnel from both the operations and intelligence staffs may attend, but people simply wanting to observe should not be in the debriefing area. The desired atmosphere is small and personal, while maintaining professional decorum. With traumatized teams, it is especially important to create a stable and calm atmosphere.

Follow the Rules

Everyone attending the debriefing must under-

stand the rules. While the proceedings may appear informal, debriefers observe a strict protocol. Everyone attending must understand that the person conducting the debrief, no matter what rank, is in charge at all times. This prevents conflict, and it allows the debriefing to proceed in an orderly manner.

Interested staffs may submit questions or concerns for the debriefer to address during the session; in this way, all "customers" receive as much information as possible. One hard and fast rule is that the debriefer is the only one allowed to address the patrol members during the debriefing. This strengthens the rapport between the debriefer and the RT members, by not bringing "strangers" in to interrogate the patrol.


The team should sit together in the center of the "stage," in front of the map of their operational area. The debriefer sits near them where they all can see and have access to the maps. Other participants such as recorders, mental health professionals, interested staff members, and others sit in a second and third row of chairs back from the map. This reinforces the fact that the team members are the center of the debrief. (See Chart 1.) This helps lower their inhibitions to speak out, especially when the audience is kept to a small group of people the team knows.

The debriefer should not lead the soldier reconstructing the mission, but he must keep each member focused and ask questions to clarify information being brought out. The patrol leader or RT leader should be the key speaker, but not the only speaker. Each member should get a chance to express his own observations. I have debriefed teams where the team leader didn't want anyone else on the team to speak but him. This attitude defeats the purpose of a debriefing: to get information from the team as a whole. It's entirely possible for one member to have seen something other members missed. Just because only one person saw something does not mean that it didn't happen or wasn't there.

The debriefing gives the members an opportunity to raise issues of support, communication, and coordination. This is the time for the patrol or RT to bring up any other deficiencies in the planning or execution. The debriefing should not be allowed to degenerate into a "bitch" session, but it is the place to analyze the mission so that planning processes, training, and SOPs can reflect lessons learned.

Recording the Debriefing

The debriefer should not try to record the proceedings as the mission is reconstructed. He must



concentrate on controlling the debriefing and helping the members reconstruct the mission. At least two or more people should act solely as recorders. They should concentrate on locations, times, direction of movement, and any other information the debriefer deems important. (See Chart 2.)

If the debriefing is recorded manually, at least two recording devices should be set up to record all the information accurately and with continuity. Voice and video recorders can capture all the facts of a debriefing and are excellent historical records. Copies of tapes can be used for formal patrol reports when many patrols are in progress at one time and the operational tempo increases. Taping can also reduce the number of requests to attend the live debriefing.

Even if the debriefing is videotaped, the debriefer should prepare an overlay showing planned routes and infiltration/exfiltration points. It should be laid over the enemy situation in a different color pen or pencil. The debriefer can record actual routes and infiltration/exfiltration points on the debriefing overlay. He can mark down locations of key events, accompanied with short narratives of the events. He can then use this to compile the final formal patrol report, along with notes from the recorders and tapes.

The original overlays and maps should never be destroyed or discarded. Once they are no longer needed, they should be forwarded to the command historian. Often ignored in peacetime, the command historian is eager to store actual operations overlays, maps, patrol orders, and debriefing reports to build a historical data base. While these documents may be considered of little immediate value, such historical artifacts are increasingly important as time passes.

After the Debriefing

When the debriefing is over, the debriefer should make sure members have a place to sleep, shower, and get a clean set of clothes. If some members were evacuated or moved for medical treatment after extraction, the patrol leader or RT leader should get medical updates from the medical clearing platoon or field hospital that received the casualties. Preferably, this should be done before the debriefing starts. Clearly, knowing the condition of their comrades allows the patrol or RT members to better concentrate on the debriefing.

The challenge of debriefing is that most patrol and LRRP debriefings are conducted in the middle of ongoing combat operations. Unfortunately, in extraordinary circumstances, it may even be necessary to "turn around" a patrol or RT for another mission. This is another reason why patrol members must be debriefed as soon as they return from a mission.

In training, we must create a mind-set that debriefings are conducted immediately after the patrol or RT returns. Commanders must reinforce this by requiring that patrol reports be submitted in a certain number of hours after the patrol returns. And it must be rigidly enforced. Units should practice the art of debriefing during training and field exercises. If the process is treated lightly and lessons learned are not used, a valuable tool to recover information and improve operations is lost.

MSG Wells is a former Marine sergeant who has served in a variety of intelligence NCO and officer positions. He has a bachelor of science degree in Government and Politics, is a graduate of the Post Graduate Intelligence Program at the DIC, and has completed a master of arts degree in International Relations. MSG Wells is the Operations NCO, 519th MI Battalion.

PATROL NARRATIVE

MSN ID: _____
DTG OF DEBRIEF: _____
DEBRIEFER: _____
MAPS and CHARTS: _____
PIR/OIR: _____
PATROL NARRATIVE: _____

(The patrol narrative should include the following information in the text of the report or listed as sub-titles in the final written report:

CONDUCT OF PARTOL PART I

Time of Departure
Infiltration Method Planned/Used
Departure Location
Insertion Route
Enemy Locations on Insertion Route
Terrain Observed on Insertion Route
Map Corrections Along Insertion Route
Insertion Point Planned/Used

AREA OF OPERATION

Predominant Terrain Features
Vegetation (type, thickness)
LZ's and DZ's
Militia/Para-military Units
Civilian Police/Security Forces
Traffic Control Measures on Roads
Roadways w/Traffic and Condition
Population Density and Locations

ENEMY ACTIVITY

Types/Size Units
Locations
Uniforms/Insignia/Patches
Weapons/Equipment
Activity
Fighting Positions

ENCOUNTERS WITH ENEMY FORCES

Enemy Casualties
Patrol Casualties
Friendly Equipment Lost/Captured/Destroyed
Captured Enemy Equipment/PW's

CONDUCT OF PATROL PART II

DTG of Extraction
Extraction Method Planned/Used
Extraction Point Planned/Used
Extraction Route
Enemy Locations on Extraction Route
Map Corrections Along Extraction Route
Extraction Point Planned/Used

MISCELLANEOUS

Unusual Observations
Lack of/or Strange Animal Behavior
Mutilated or Dying Plant Life
Strange/Uncommon Insects
Abandoned Military Equipment
Abandoned Population Centers

Chart 2

WANTED

Airborne-Qualified Master Sergeants and Sergeants First Class

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, NC, is seeking airborne-qualified master sergeants in MOS 98Z and sergeants first class in MOS 98G and 98H to serve with Special Operations Forces. Interested personnel should submit a Request for Personnel Action (DA Form 4187), through their command channels to PERSCOM, Military Intelligence Branch. For more information, contact Sergeant Major Santiago at DSN 239-5734/6302/5357 or commercial (919) 432-5734/6302/5357.

ception of tactical ground surveillance); lack in imagery, CI, and HUMINT; and, along with the G2/S2 at division and brigade, without basic automation and communications to fuse and move intelligence.

- ☐ There was much to be done with linguists and with our Reserves and National Guard.
- On the plus side—
- ☐ Many of our systems—like Joint STARS, UAV, Trojan Spirit, and Guardrail—worked superbly.
- ☐ Our approach to intelligence since the late 1970's—all-source, multidiscipline, and under combat commanders—proved itself. Every intelligence area—HUMINT, IMINT, SIGINT, CI, TECHINT, MASINT—contributed to Army operations, whether to prepare for deployment, to train, or to attack.
- ☐ We were able to focus theater and national intelligence to support ground combat at the tactical level. To do this we rediscovered the singular role the commander plays in focusing intelligence on his plan and operation.
- ☐ We also discovered a few new things, like how to synchronize and gain and maintain priority for intelligence collection systems above corps so that they support corps and division commanders.

A Focus Downward

So where are we now in MI, and perhaps as important, where are we going? Right now we are implementing a plan to balance the MI force and to focus it downwardly on the combat commander, to get intelligence on time, every time, to division and brigade levels. For example, MI battalions at division will undergo a change over the next two years to balance capabilities with IMINT (including ground surveillance), HUMINT, CI, automation, communications, and SIGINT as well. We will do this without a plus-up in the battalion's size.

INSCOM MI brigades have changed structure and oriented their support downwardly. We placed a team, called a Corps MI Support Element, in each corps from INSCOM's theater MI brigades to help gain priority for and to focus theater and national intelligence on the corps. We also took major steps to link into the joint system by placing significant elements of Army all-source analysis at the theater

Joint Intelligence Center, by making our automation and communications systems interoperable, and by being full team players in supporting theater Commander in Chief intelligence requirements. We have developed and fielded the initial intelligence fusion systems, under the all-source analysis system, into some corps and divisions. Our next big challenge is to link from EAC to brigades, and in this new force projection Army to provide common, graphic intelligence, IEW synchronization, and target development from the brigade to the joint level.

A Force Projection Mode

With all of this ongoing, however, I believe we have much more to do. We must put more thought into intelligence support in force projection operations. As I have thought this through, I conclude that we must profoundly change the way we conduct intelligence in this world of crisis management. So allow me to take a bit more space to describe what I mean. I ask that you take mental note and that in the future, as we work together to adapt MI to the new environment, you provide your own ideas for integration into future MI doctrine, training, and operations.

So, think about this a moment. When we trained and readied ourselves for the central region fight in Europe, we did so on the doctrinal principle that tactical intelligence for combat operations would flow from lower to higher. We also assumed that the intelligence foundation—the so-called "threat"—on which we built our organization's training and modernization would be there. It was, because the U.S. Army put the intelligence priority on the Soviet Union. From these two premises—tactical intelligence from the ground up and available, profound, nearly automatic intelligence on the "threat"—we built our entire vision for MI support.

But force projection provides an entirely different reality. There is no one threat. We now have many potential missions that require an active command role to focus intelligence on priority requirements. We cannot assume, as we did with the case of the Soviets, that an intelligence baseline will be there upon alert unless commanders drive it daily, like they do training. Also, in force projection, tactical intelligence comes from the top down during most phases of the operation until organic tactical intelligence elements are engaged. That means that brigades, divisions, and corps must pull intelligence in from above their levels and focus it on specific priorities.

This says that force readiness must take on new meaning. Think of it this way. When one of our naval battle groups is afloat, the commander de-

mands continuous, real-world intelligence for executing a number of potential missions and for protecting his force. If our divisions and corps stand ready to project force anywhere in several potential contingencies, then it seems reasonable that they must also have direct, continuous "hot" links into the Intelligence System of Systems to provide and, perhaps more important, to focus intelligence on their tactical and operational planning and needs.

Force projection also suggests that there is a crossover point in intelligence which commanders must plan for and train to, where organic tactical intelligence begins to take on a role in the area of operations and must integrate with theater and national intelligence coverage to synchronize each into a meaningful whole.

In force projection, combat elements tend to build from the bottom up vice the top down as they did in the central region. When we moved to the old general deployment position, we had a well-developed communications zone infrastructure from communications to bunkers, and we sent corps, divisions, brigades, and battalions forward. Now, we take our communications with us and develop the infrastructure on the go from what we bring and from what is available in the area of operations.

This means that MI must be much more flexible, capable of deploying small teams with links to a remoted split base that is dedicated to pushing intelligence, specifically designed for the tactical commander, forward. We must go in light for force deployment and protection reasons, and we must also be capable of tailoring the MI entry force. There will be a premium on HUMINT, CI, and SIGINT designed for unconventional signals as well as imagery capabilities like the UAV, Joint STARS, and TENCAP downlinks. In peacekeeping operations, every soldier is an intelligence reporter be-

cause of contact with the populace.

Coalition operations pose special challenges for intelligence operations, for example, in keeping U.S. commanders within maneuver formations informed, and, conversely, in forming a common picture for them and their coalition counterparts.

These and other aspects of force projection operations have changed the way we must think and direct intelligence. They point out the pivotal importance of the commander's role in intelligence, not just when the crisis begins, but well before and throughout. Force projection requires flexibility, intelligence agility, and focus. We need to review the entire way we manage and link collection operations and all-source analysis. We must reorient training so commanders and S2s alike learn the panoply of intelligence capabilities and how to bring them to bear on tactical priorities. Furthermore, a focus downwardly requires those at levels above corps to understand the tactical ground commander's intelligence needs. They have to visualize his perspective and tailor products for his decision.

To me, and if I am right, this all means we have only just begun to understand the implications of the end of the Cold War on the Army—at least on Army Intelligence.

What I have described here places renewed emphasis on the MI Corps motto, "Always Out Front." We are out front in our thinking and we must be out front in providing real-world intelligence as a priority means of force readiness.

We have a firm foundation upon which to build and a well-thought-out plan for change. With a continued MI team effort and the great support of combat commanders, we can continue as a premier Military Intelligence Corps for our Army.

VANTAGE POINT

(Continued from page 3)

tactical and technical proficiency achieved by only the rarest of military professionals. His legacy is seen in the hundreds of soldiers whose lives and careers he touched through deep caring and mentoring as they too strived to meet the highest standards of military competency. To further honor CSM Ice, we have established a leadership award in his name to be given in ANCO to an NCO who

exhibits leadership qualities that set him or her apart from the rest.

We are developing the same award for a BNCOC student. But, I would like you to suggest in whose name this award should be given, out of the many outstanding MI NCOs, past and present. To offer suggestions, contact me at DSN 821-1146, or CSM Sterling T. McCormick, Commandant, NCO Academy, Fort Huachuca, at DSN 879-8919.

In closing, I again express my appreciation for the warm welcome my family and I have received. I feel honored to be serving with you in this capacity.

"Soldiers First!" Hoo-ah!

The packet switching concept has merit, but has yet to be tested.

Amazingly, 3d ID ASPS analysts were able to maintain a 90 percent picture of the entire battlefield throughout Exercise Warfighter. We had never before experienced this level of detailed information.

Thanks to the Warrior system, we have entered a new era in tactical intelligence data processing. No longer will the division commander have to make decisions based solely on unit symbols stuck onto a situation map. Instead, he will have available—

- ☐ An automated picture of the battlefield.
- ☐ Graphic representations of enemy air defense coverage showing air corridors for his aviation brigade.
- ☐ A graphic illustration of an enemy unit's movement history showing what routes the approaching enemy selected and which routes are likely choices for it's follow-on echelons.
- ☐ The area in which enemy air defense and ar-

tillery are gathering to form division or Army artillery groups. He will be able to strike at enemy air defense systems the moment they become active and produce an electronic signature.

Clearly, all this data gives the commander a much more comprehensive view of the enemy.

Not only does Warrior bring the division headquarters into the electronic information age, but it also gives this data, and a common view of the battlefield, to all maneuver commanders in the division. The same products provided to the commanding general will also be available to the three maneuver brigade commanders, the combat aviation brigade commander, and the cavalry commander. **This will provide a seamless intelligence network.**

MAJ Alan Norris is the deputy G2 of the 3d ID in Wuerzburg, Germany. He is a graduate of CGSC, the U.S. Army Russian Institute, and the Defense Strategy Course.

CW2 Kenneth Reese is the 3d ID's emanations analysis technician (ELINT). He recently served as OIC of the EPDS system at the 525th MI Brigade, XVIII Airborne Corps. He deployed with that system to Desert Storm.

Military Intelligence



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TRAINING NOTES

The SDT: A Measure of Success

by Karen Spath

The Army's new Self-Development Test (SDT) for sergeants, staff sergeants, and sergeants first class is nearing the end of its second year. By now, most Active Army NCOs in these ranks have taken the SDT at least once—but not for the record. Army senior leadership directed that, for the first two years, the SDT be used to assess, debug, and fine-tune the test. Soldiers would take the SDT, but scores would not be used for decisions affecting their careers.

The validation period is coming to a close. While the validation will continue another year for the Reserve Component, in FY 94 Active Army NCOs will begin testing for the record. This means that SDT scores will be entered into NCOs' personnel records and will be used for promotion purposes and school selection. The SDT will become an integral part of the Army's Leader Development Program. As an NCO, what does this mean for your development as a leader and for your future military career?

Leader Development

Along with training and assignments, self-development is one of the three pillars of leader development. A former Sergeant Major of the Army described it as probably the most neglected pillar. There are several reasons for this. Self-development is not something an NCO, or anyone else for that matter, has time to do today. It can always be put off until next week, or next month. Then, if a day does come along when you have some time for self-development, what do you do? Read a book? Which book? Practice a skill? Which skill? Solve a problem? Which problem? If you do any of these, how do you know how well you have done? Do you get any feedback?

When fully implemented, the SDT promises to make self-development a stronger and less neglected pillar of leader development. As an NCO, what does the SDT mean in terms of your own leadership development?

- ☐ The SDT will provide strong incentive for self-development because the NCO has a stake in doing well.
- ☐ The SDT will guide you and give focus to your self-development effort.
- ☐ The SDT Notice will tell an NCO what materials he or she needs to study to prepare for the test. This gives direction and discipline to self-development.
- ☐ Finally, and perhaps most important, SDT test scores will give NCOs feedback on their self-development efforts.

These elements are necessary for effective learning, and that's what self-development is all about—effective learning.

A wise teacher once said that in order to learn, one must **want** something, **do** something, and **get** something. Given the importance of SDT scores, soldiers **want** to score well on SDT. Given the guidance they get from the Notice, they know what to **do**. In the short term, they **get** scores telling them how well they did; and in the long term, they **get** the career benefits that come from doing well on the SDT.

Military Career

What does the SDT mean in terms of your military career? It means that you can influence the progress of your career by your own self-development efforts. Who will be tomorrow's successful NCO? The successful NCO will be the soldier who uses personal time and effort to increase technical and tactical skills, and who learns to lead soldiers and plan and conduct training. No longer can an NCO rely solely on the formal schooling available through NCOES (PLDC, BNCOC, ANCO) or unit and on-the-job training.

The successful NCO will be the soldier who seizes the initiative to develop professionally. The SDT is tangible evidence of the success of these efforts.

Ms. Spath is an education specialist at the Army Training Support Center, Fort Eustis, VA. For more information contact her at DSN 927-4581.

Military Intelligence Corps Hall of Fame

HONORARY SERGEANT MAJOR

The MI Hall of Fame honors former MI professionals who have made significant contributions to the MI Corps. Distinguished Members of the Corps (DMOCs) are selected from Hall of Fame honorees. These selections are made based on the DMOC's unique ability to act as ambassador for the Corps.

CSM Louis H. Rothenstein enlisted in the Regular Army February 21, 1956. He completed basic and advanced individual training as an infantryman at Fort Ord, CA, and served in the 2d Infantry Regiment, 5th Infantry Division. He was then assigned to Europe where he performed duties in France and Turkey. He deployed to Lebanon in November 1958 during the Middle East crisis. He returned to Continental Army Command Headquarters in 1960 as a sergeant.

In 1961, CSM Rothenstein was assigned to the Korean Military Advisory Group. In Korea, he collected valuable biographic information on Korean officials and submitted numerous field corrections to maps. While in Korea, he was promoted to staff sergeant and learned aerial observation, imagery, and terrain analysis.

In 1963, CSM Rothenstein was assigned as an intelligence analyst, G2 Section, Berlin Brigade. After his promotion to sergeant first class, he provided many intelligence breakthroughs on Soviet equipment and order of battle holdings. CSM Rothenstein established major observation posts for the brigade and instituted field testing on new collection equipment.

In 1966, he was assigned to Vietnam as an intelligence advisor for Team 93 in the Kien Hoa Sector. CSM Rothenstein obtained new intelligence assets that greatly expanded the collection capabilities of his team and province.

He returned to Germany in 1967 as an analyst in the U.S. Army Europe Headquarters, Technical Intelligence Center. He was instrumental in updating numerous order of battle books, converting manual files to an automated system, and publishing two identification handbooks.

CSM Rothenstein returned to Vietnam in July 1969 as an advisor and first sergeant with D Company, 5th Special Forces Group. He participated in dangerous air reconnaissance missions near the



Command Sergeant Major
Louis H. Rothenstein, Retired

Cambodian border. From 1970 to 1972, he was advisor to Army Reserve units in California and an intelligence sergeant in Korea with Headquarters, Eighth Army.

Following duty as first sergeant for D Company, 1st Battalion, Fort Huachuca, he served with the 25th Infantry Division as the G2 sergeant major. From 1978 to 1981 he was an instructor at the Sergeants Major Academy. In 1981, he activated the 102d MI Battalion in Korea and served as its first CSM.

He was appointed the first command sergeant major for the 513th MI Group, Fort Monmouth, VA, in August 1982. CSM Rothenstein's distinguished career culminated as the Command Sergeant Major of the U.S. Army Communications and Electronics Command.

He retired in February 1986. In 1990, he was inducted into the MI Corps Hall of Fame, and selected as a Distinguished Member of the Corps and the Honorary Sergeant Major of the Corps.



Hall of Fame Activities

**The Military Intelligence Corps
honored six professionals and dedicated five buildings
during the Hall of Fame activities July 8th and 9th.**

The 111th MI Brigade conducted a demonstration for the new Hall of Fame inductees and other VIPs July 8th at the Integrated Field Training Exercise (IFTX) site. July 9 activities began with a ceremony in Alvarado Hall, where the Hall of Fame is located. A luncheon at the Lakeside Officers' and Civilians' Club followed. Later, two new buildings in the MI NCO Academy—Ice Hall and Wilson Barracks—were dedicated.

The five inductees into the Hall of Fame include Brigadier General Oscar W. Koch, Chief Warrant Officer Joseph E. Richard, Mr. Herbert W. Taylor, Ms. Elizabeth Van Lew, Colonel William P. Walters, and During the ceremony, Retired Colonel Harry K. Fukahara, a 1988 inductee into the Hall of Fame, was honored as a Distinguished Member of the MI Corps.

Five facilities in the new Intelligence Center academic complex were dedicated, including: Yardley Dining Facility; Friedman Hall, a special intelligence training facility; Koch Barracks; Ice Hall, a classroom and training facility for the NCO Academy; and Wilson Barracks, also for the NCO Academy.

Hall of Fame Inductees

BG Oscar W. Koch

As General Patton's G2 during World War II, Brigadier General Koch pioneered the concept of all-source intelligence and analysis. He never allowed General Patton to be surprised by enemy action. After World War II, Brigadier General Koch organized and commanded the Army's first peacetime intelligence school. He developed a G2 intelligence planning cycle that was the forerunner of the modern-day intelligence cycle. His book, **G2:**

Intelligence for Patton, is required reading for MI officers.

CWO Joseph E. Richard

Chief Warrant Officer Richard's career spanned 32 years of exemplary service in cryptanalytic and SIGINT assignments. During World War II, he was instrumental in analyzing high-level Japanese Army communications which led to the first break into the Japanese Army transport system. Chief Warrant Officer Richard continued to make substantial contributions to allied SIGINT during the war and later as an original member of the National Security Agency in Washington and overseas. He retired from the Army in 1973.

Mr. Herbert W. Taylor

Throughout 27 years of exemplary service, Mr. Taylor's professionalism, dedication, and leadership set the standard for senior military analysts. His outstanding accomplishments include preserving separate-service intelligence organizations above corps level, improving production of scientific and technologic intelligence, and fostering increased intelligence support for tactical combat forces. Mr. Taylor was the special assistant to eight assistant chiefs of staff for intelligence. Throughout his career, Mr. Taylor made significant contributions toward a more professional understanding and use of intelligence. His commitment and expertise have made an indelible mark on our Corps and our Nation.

Ms. Elizabeth Van Lew

Ms. Van Lew was one of the Civil War's most effective spies, and her brave actions added significantly to America's intelligence heritage. She

established an extensive espionage network, providing valuable information daily to the Union Army. General Grant and his chief intelligence officer declared Ms. Van Lew's intelligence the best available during the Virginia Campaign. Ms. Van Lew's courage, leadership, and enduring sense of responsibility made a profound impact on the MI Corps.

COL William P. Walters

During an exceptional 34-year career, Colonel Walters served in a variety of command and staff assignments in MI. During the Vietnam War, he led interrogation teams in support of highly sensitive and specialized missions. Colonel Walters commanded one of the first combat electronic warfare intelligence battalions, and he effectively implemented new doctrine, concepts, and training. Colonel Walters served as the director of combat developments at the Intelligence Center, commanded Field Station SYNOR, was the G2 for the XVIII Airborne Corps during Operation Just Cause, and was the Deputy G2 for Army Forces during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In every assignment, he represented the Corps with innovative leadership and unwavering loyalty, and made

significant contributions to the future intelligence structure of our Army.

Distinguished Member of the MI Corps

COL Harry K. Fukahara

After being released from an American Japanese detention camp in 1942, Harry Fukahara enlisted in the U.S. Army and served with distinction in MI for 49 years. During World War II, he earned a battlefield commission while participating in the New Guinea and Philippine Campaigns. After the war, Colonel Fukahara was the commander of the CI Field Office, Osaka, Japan; chief, CI Investigative and Liaison Detachment, Tokyo; deputy commander, 109th Intelligence Corps Group, Fort Meade, MD; commander, CI and Collection Detachment, Tokyo; and military governor, the Yaeyama Islands Group. After his retirement from the Army in 1971, he remained active in intelligence with the MI Career Excepted Program. Colonel Fukahara was inducted into the MI Corps Hall of Fame in 1988 and in 1991 the President of the United States awarded him the Distinguished Federal Civilian Service Medal.

PROPONENT NOTES



Officer Notes

Advanced course students. MIOAC and the Armor Officer Advanced Course have begun a postgraduate exchange program. Four recent MIOAC graduates will be selected to attend the Small Group Instruction (SGI) portion of each AOAC, starting with MIOAC 93-9 (July 26-December 17). The four officers will attend the SGI of AOAC 94-2, which begins January 30. The program will provide "cross-fertilization" at the tactical level between the two branches. This is a competitive program open to all MIOAC officers. After graduation, these officers will receive a tactical assignment.

MI Aviators. PERSCOM has approved the ASI of F4 for MI Aviators (AOC 15C35). ASI F4 is awarded to MI aviators who complete training on the RC-12K/N/P models. In the past, only ASI F3 was awarded for training on the RC-12D/G/H models. RC12K/N/P training begins here October 1.

Great news for MI aviators! PERSCOM has ap-

proved a change to **AR 600-82, The U.S. Army Regimental System**, giving MI aviators the option of affiliating with the MI Corps. The change will be in the 1994 **AR 600-82** update. The SIDPERS transaction and ORB update must follow the **AR 600-82** update. However, MI aviators are authorized to affiliate with the MI Corps now, to wear the MI Corps crest, and to receive the MI Corps membership certificate. (MI Corps affiliation impacts neither assignments nor flight pay.) A subsequent message will announce when SIDPERS will accept MI Corps affiliation actions. MI aviators who wish to become members of the MI Corps and receive the membership certificate should contact Captain Jerry Thompson or Captain Kirby Daras, ATZS-MI, or call DSN 821-1180/1181.

Aviation Branch has conducted an AOC restructuring. MI aviators will redesignate from AOC 15C or 15K to a 16-series AOC. This action took effect in September. The new 16 series provides specificity

by type aircraft. Restructure for AOC 16, Intelligence/SEMA and Fixed Wing Aviation looks like this: 16A, RC-12D/G/H (SEMA); 16B, OV-1; 16C, RC-12K/N/P (SEMA); 16D, FW maintenance; 16E, RU-21 (SEMA); 16F, U-21; 16G, C-12, FW general; 16H, C-20; 16I, C-21; 16J, C-23 (RC); 16K, C-26 (RC); 16L, O-5A/EO-5B (DH-7 SEMA); 16M, FW, nonstandard; and 16N, EH-60 (SEMA).

Enlisted Notes

CMF33 soldiers. If you're a CMF 33 soldier, are you tired of hearing about UGIP, PGIP, MESAP, MECAP, ad nauseam? Do you feel frustrated because no one offers college classes in maintenance management? If so, you need to pick up a copy of **DA Pam 351-20, Army Correspondence Course Program Catalog**. Check out Chapter 4, Section II, U.S. Army Logistics Management College. You might be surprised at what it offers. Many courses earn college credit and they all deal with the complex issues of maintenance management. These courses are not for the weak of heart, however.

96G soldiers. For all you 97G's out there, PERSCOM has approved the new title of your MOS. The next change to **AR 611-201, Enlisted Career Management Fields and Military Occupational Specialties**, will show MOS 97G as Multidiscipline Counterintelligence Analyst. We'll keep you posted on the details.

96R soldiers. We continue to monitor the status of MOS 96R soldiers. Promotions for the current year have already exceeded the totals for the past two years: 30 promotions to sergeant in 1992, and 44 as of July 1993. PERSCOM has identified soldiers who may be approaching the Retention Control Point in the 1994/95 time frame. We are working with PERSCOM to make sure they get every opportunity to continue their careers. Also, PERSCOM is offering an early retirement to staff sergeants with 18 years in service. This will open more promotions for sergeants on a promotion standing list in the future. Hopefully, things will continue to improve.

33V soldiers. Master Sergeant Sagmoe, CMF 33 Career Advisor, PERSCOM, informs us that effective October 1, MOS 33V merges into MOS 33R. A maintenance transition course is available to associate former 33V's with 33R systems. Soldiers scheduled to PCS when a transition course is available will be considered for TDY en route attendance.

The Specialized Training Branch schedules soldiers desiring to attend training in a TDY and return status. Submit applications to: Commander,

PERSCOM, ATTN: TAPC-EPT-F, 2461 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22331-0453. Request course number 102-ASIY2 (33R), Aviation Systems Repairer (Transition). A Service Remaining Requirement of 16 months after course completion is required. The TDY and return is funded by the current unit. Fort Devens will hold two classes in FY 94. Seats are available only for the February 1994 class. For more information, call Master Sergeant Sagmoe at DSN 221-0076, commercial (703) 325-0076.

Warrant Officer Notes

DA Pam 600-11, Warrant Officer Professional Development, is in revision and the MI portion has undergone substantial change, including revised descriptions of functions, professional development objectives, and civilian education programs for which officers may apply. Civilian education programs will be MOS-related with a look to the future. This change will bring **DA Pam 600-11** into line with the Warrant Officer Leader Development Action Plan (WOLDAP). Along with changes to **AR 611-112 Personnel Selection and Classification Manual of Warrant Officer Military Occupational Specialties**, this change will give warrant officers, their commanders, and their assignment managers the regulatory guidance to plan and execute a successful and rewarding career.

Language Notes

OCMI and the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Intelligence, Operations, and Personnel, all major commands, and the affected units are working to solve Arabic linguist shortages. To help alleviate the problem, the Army Language Program Review Committee is concentrating on increasing retention, recruitments, and the training output.

We have nearly completed the development of the Linguist Life Cycle Model. This model will provide the blueprint for linguist professional development over an entire career. Applicable to both AC and RC, the model will guide Army management officials and the individual linguist on a path leading to greater linguistic job performance.

Training developments (soldiers manual, self development test, POIs) and lesson plans are ready for implementation for MOS 97L (RC). In July, officials from the 300th MI Brigade (Linguist) and other 97L developers decided to conduct three iterations next summer of a two-week course for soldiers already MOS and language qualified. They will also conduct the four-week Advanced Individual Training course at Fort Huachuca during summer 1995. We expect formal approval of the MOS soon.

TOTAL FORCE



By Lieutenant Colonel John Craig

RC Soldiers Attending The Intelligence Center

Before cutting orders, consider this guidance for Reserve Component (RC) soldiers attending the Intelligence Center:

- ☐ **AR 611-201, Enlisted Career Management Fields and Military Occupational Specialties**, and **DA Pam 351-4, Army Formal Schools Catalog**, give course prerequisites, including security clearance requirements for soldiers needing SCI access.
- ☐ **AR 600-9, The Army Weight Control Program**, states that soldiers who don't meet body fat composition will be denied enrollment and will be sent home. This applies to all prior service soldiers and officers.
- ☐ Prior service soldiers and officers attending courses that are MOS producing or over 90 days MUST report with their 201 files.

Refer questions to Sergeant Major Wagner, ARNG Liaison, or Sergeant Major Pacheco, USAR Liaison: DSN 821-3982/3984, commercial (602) 533-3982/3984.

RC MI General Officer Position

Colonel Michael E. Dunlavey will fill one of the Army's two RC MI general officer positions. He is the new deputy commanding general, INSCOM (IMA). Colonel Dunlavey is a trial lawyer and former assistant district attorney from Erie, PA. His four-year active duty assignment includes tours in Germany and Vietnam. On the Reserve side, he recently commanded a strategic MI detachment (MID[S]) and served as assistant division commander, 98th Division (Training).

MI Linguist MOS

The MI Proponent will be one of the primary players in the Total Army's language program. The Intelligence Center is the proponent for the Army's newest MOS—an MOS that, for now, is found only in the RC.

The new MOS, 97L Translator/Interpreter, en-

ables the RC to make up any shortfall in the AC's capability to meet the requirement for language-qualified soldiers to support contingency force operations. It also allows us to take full advantage of existing native and civilian school-trained linguists. Since only language-qualified prior-service soldiers and RC enlistees qualify as 97L's, the savings in training dollars is enormous. Moreover, the expertise and hands-on knowledge a native speaker possesses cannot normally be duplicated by a DLI graduate.

New RC Faces at the MI Proponent

Three new AGRs have reported in to the Intelligence Center. They are your new representatives at the Home of MI: working RC MI issues, supporting ARNG and USAR unit training, and dealing with RC enlisted and officer students. Lieutenant Colonel John Craig, the former Reserve Advisor at the Intelligence School-Devens, works out of the Reserve Forces Office. His move is part of the consolidation of intelligence training to Fort Huachuca. Sergeant Major Joan Wagner is the ARNG Liaison NCO. She comes to us from the Army National Guard Professional Education Center, North Little Rock, AR. She works on issues concerning ARNG officers, NCOs, and enlisted soldiers.

Sergeant Major Antonio Pacheco is the new USAR Liaison NCO. He was recently assigned to Fort Knox as the USAR Training Liaison NCO. He has extensive personnel, recruiting, and liaison experience. Sergeant Major Pacheco serves USAR soldiers, NCOs, and officers training here.

New RF-I Course

Beginning next summer, the 6th Reserve Forces-Intelligence (RF-I) School, Fort Huachuca, will train the new RC-configured ASI K3, Communications EW Operators Course. This is a follow-on course designed to train 98G soldiers in tactical SIGINT equipment operations. All AC 98G soldiers assigned to tactical MI units take this course after AIT. However, the selection mechanism effectively excludes RC 98G IET soldiers.

Recognizing the need and utility of this training,

the MI Proponent has developed a two-week RC version. The course not only satisfies the ASI requirement, but also provides the tactical RC MI force with an immediately usable voice interceptor who can deploy, emplace, and operate state-of-the-art SIGINT equipment.

RC Unit Support to MI Proponent

For the last three years, an RC MID(S) has provided direct support to the Intelligence Center. Only nine strong, the detachment produced strategic appraisals that have been used not only by the Intelligence Center but also by other agencies in the Army's intelligence community. This remarkable unit, the 434th MID(S), hails from New Haven, CT. It is one of 59 similar detachments scattered around the U.S. Each performs a specialized mission in support of DOD's worldwide intelligence effort.

The 434th's initial tasking was to prepare an eight-hour block of instruction on the strategic threat. The result was so successful that the block was expanded to 26 hours and is taught at both our MIOBC and MIOAC. Students and faculty alike have praised the product as current, concise, and doctrinally sound. Remarkably, nine RC soldiers are helping to prepare the Army's future MI leaders to deal with crises in the global arena.

Now let's talk about the 434th MID(S). This unit was formed after World War II around a nucleus of Reserve officers and soldiers who happen to be Yale University professors. Historically, their focus was on Asian issues. However, since the emergence of a multipolar world, their focus has expanded to encompass the global threat.

The detachment's current commander is Colonel Jack S. Chase, a West Pointer, Vietnam veteran, and War College graduate. He brought the 434th to the Intelligence Center and deserves much credit for its outstanding reputation. The incoming commander is Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Simmons, an adjunct professor at Yale University and a former Director of the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee. The other members of the 434th hold equally impressive credentials. Several are linguists and have traveled overseas extensively.

The 434th MID(S) is an excellent example of the synergism generated when an RC unit trains and supports an AC organization with a meaningful real-time intelligence production mission.

Readiness Quick-Fixes Approved

Major General Paul E. Menoher Jr., while still commanding general of the Intelligence Center, approved three quick-fix no-cost measures. They will improve RC unit readiness, conserve scarce and

costly MI soldiers, and open RC MI slots to trained AC soldiers transitioning to the RC:

- ☐ MOS-qualified 96B soldiers can now fill 97G vacancies in RC CI companies if a qualified 97G cannot be accessed.

Comment: Because of low density, this MOS has never been configured for RC presentation. Substitution in the RC CI companies improves readiness reporting without harming mission capability.

- ☐ MOS-qualified 33Y, 33R, and 33V soldiers may fill 33T vacancies if a qualified 33T cannot be accessed. MOS-qualified 33T's may also fill 33R vacancies.

Comment: The basic electronic training phase for 33-series MOSs is identical. The basic and advanced electronic repair skills are held in common. Students are broken out only when system-specific training occurs. Finally, there are no slots in RC MI units for those highly qualified 33Y's who are now transitioning from the AC in large numbers.

- ☐ 35D-qualified MI officers may fill 35B slots in RC MID(S) if a qualified 35B cannot be accessed.

Comment: There is no RC-configured course for the 35B strategic intelligence AOC. Officers assigned to MID(S) must already meet strict selection criteria: advanced degree, language, and equivalent civilian experience. These criteria qualify 35D MI officers to work in the strategic arena.

MI Pre-Command Course and Pre-Assignment Course

The MI Pre-Command Course (PCC) gives MI commanders or G2 designees a review of major doctrinal, organizational, and process developments ongoing at the Intelligence Center. This course prepares you to be an effective MI unit commander or G2.

Class dates for FY 94 are: class 94-01, reports 3 Oct 93, starts 4 Oct 93, ends 15 Oct 93; class 94-04, reports 17 Jan 94, starts 18 Jan 94, ends 28 Jan 94; class 94-06, reports 28 Feb 94, starts 1 Mar 94, ends 11 Mar 94; and class 94-09, reports 9 May 94, starts 10 May 94, ends 20 May 94.

The Pre-Assignment Course is similar to the PCC but is for MI sergeants major. Offered twice a year, the class dates parallel the PCC so that commanders and sergeants major can attend together.

POC for the PCC is Mr. Welsh, DSN 879-0750 or (602) 538-0750; Master Sergeant Palmer is POC for the PAC, DSN 879-8935 or (602) 538-8935.

LTC John Craig is the Reserve Forces point of contact. Phone numbers are DSN 821-1584/1176 or commercial (602) 533-1584/1176. Mailing address is Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center, ATTN: ATZS-RA, Fort Huachuca, AZ, 85613-6000.

(Continued from page 1)

I was hoping Goldman and Vardac would have discussed in greater detail the methodology of predictive analysis. It was quite clear they both understood the importance of effective forecasting in the avoidance of war, which is the ultimate goal of strategic analysis. However, they merely alluded to it in their last section. I understand that in the interest of brevity one sometimes cannot cover all the concepts of the intelligence cycle. It is my assertion that predictive analysis is the heart of intelligence and ultimately produces the end product of the intelligence cycle.

I hope that, in the future, these two individuals will treat us to an elaborate study on predictive analysis.

SGT Elliot A. Jardines, USAR
Fairfield, CN

Dear Editor:

I recently attended an Analysis and Control Element (ACE) briefing. At a superficial level, the ACE seems to be an appropriate reorganization of analytic assets to support the MI Operational Branch Concept, while conserving personnel resources. A more detailed examination shows that, while this concept is workable, it is highly technology-dependent and lacks a detailed theoretical underpinning: for example, the relationship of the ACE to the asset management responsibilities of the MI unit commander.

The briefing stressed that, in the test at Fort Huachuca, the ACE was not simply the addition of the TCAE to the ASPS. The ACE was organized to perform certain identified functions necessary for the efficient operation of the Intelligence BOS. This "new thinking" is an excellent way to approach this concept. However, we need to carry it much further. Placing the ACE in the MI unit and then declaring it OPCON to the G2 is a fallback to "old thinking."

The ACE should be identified as a resource with two clearly defined sets of responsibilities to support the needs of the G2 (analyzed intelligence) and the MI unit commander (asset management/intelligence collection). This naturally includes the current doctrinal requirements for the G2 to provide intelligence to the other members of the general staff, such as the fire support element. The G2 and the MI unit commander should have the authority to task

the ACE for support in defined areas. The G2 requires information to support the commander's combat operations, the MI unit commander needs other types of information to fight his unit. The unifying elements that ensure synchronization are the PIR, intelligence concept, and the collection plan. If every element is working toward these goals, there should be no confusion in the ACE. Ownership should not be an issue. This frees the ACE to be positioned anywhere on the battlefield or even in an area not on the battlefield—a sanctuary.

As presented, the ACE concept shows a clear migration of traditional MI battalion responsibilities to the ACE: for example, the collection manager "recommending" positioning of MI battalion assets. The consequences of this migration need to be thought through. If the ultimate objective is to make the MI unit a logistic support element and remove the MI unit commander from the intelligence effort, then let us reorganize our TO&E to include more fuel tankers and maintenance teams. We need to be sure we are not fooling ourselves over how Army leadership sees the G2/MI unit relationship. No other branch centralizes so much control of a unit in a staff officer. Even the G3/armored cavalry squadron relationship is not comparable in terms of control of individual systems. If we plan to continue to support the necessity for an MI unit as an intelligence command and control entity, the ACE concept must recognize the difference between the needs of the G2 staff officer and the needs of the MI unit commander.

The ACE concept needs to examine in more detail the following areas: (1) **Who trains the ACE?** Is the training split: common tasks from the MI unit and intelligence training from the G2? Training is normally a command responsibility. (2) **Positioning of the ACE.** The ACE greatly enlarges the DTOC/CTOC, in contravention of the announced Army objective of downsizing command posts. Could the ACE be at the DREAR or MI battalion? Should it continue to be located wherever the G2 goes? (3) **Asset management.** How is that handled? What connection (ASAS) does the MI unit have to the ACE to "pull" information necessary for asset management? The automation that would have allowed the unit S3 to do LOS analysis and other asset management functions moved with the TCAE

to the G2.

The ACE could truly be a breakthrough in completing the integration of the Intelligence BOS. Conversely, it could be the death knell for the MI unit as an MI unit. The MI unit could become simply a headquarters company. Is that what we want? If it is, let's announce that fact and move out smartly. If not, write the ACE concept to adequately address satisfying the needs of the established command (MI unit) and staff functions (G2). One might even consider a revolutionary thought: perhaps it is time to consider relegating the G2 to a secondary role, as in the G4/DISCOM relationship. The only reason the G2 gets the commander's "bony finger" in his chest is because we, the MI Branch, tell commanders that is where to put the finger. By generating this self-fulfilling prophecy, we justify our current doctrinal trends.

This letter reflects personal opinion, not the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) position. Although I did observe an embryonic ACE in operation during the 24th ID Warfighter, my comments are not directly tied to those observations.

LTC Gary E. Phillips
Fort Carson, CO

Dear Editor:

In his article, "The S2 and Light Infantry Scouts" (Jan-Mar 1993), Captain Joseph H. Grable seems very fond of quoting Homer, Billings, and the Bible are all mentioned in his article.

I, too, have a quotation for Captain Grable, "If one does not pay attention to history one is DOOMED TO REPEAT IT." Specifically, in his section on "Effective Communications Plans," Captain Grable describes a "grid matrix report format" that is nothing more than a variation on the old "point of origin code," invented and used with disastrous results by many combat units in Vietnam.

When using this technique, locations on the map are given in relation to an arbitrary point selected on the map by the user. In this case, the grid center point is the point of origin.

While this sounds great over the radio, it is so easy to decode that some intelligence officers estimated that Viet Cong or North Vietnamese intercept operators back in 1969 could do it in less than 15 minutes with only minimal information.

To break the code, all that is required is a single radio intercept that

makes reference to the point of origin (for example, grid center point in Grable's system) and some tactical information or event (for example, road junction, tactical position, landmark, etc.) known to the enemy. From this information, the point of origin can be discovered by working backward on a map. Once the point of origin is known, all other locations identified in relation to the point (of origin) are compromised.

Information gathered in this way was used so successfully against us in Vietnam that, when discovered, it shocked the Army into action.

Knowledge of how it was being done was gained when an infantryman discovered a VC intercept site by walking into a long wire antenna. This led to the capture of a platoon-sized intercept unit and with them their all-important equipment, logs, and maps.

The captured documents indicated detailed knowledge of ambush sites, logistic locations, gun emplacements, and even B-52 strikes gained by the enemy by simply breaking the unauthorized point of origin code. It was the direct cause of many U.S. casualties and deaths.

Upon this discovery, NSA, in conjunction with USARV, immediately began what was then called Operation Touchdown, which was a serious effort to root out all unauthorized codes and cipher systems from the Army. Some years later, a training film was produced, which is still available from TASO, that gives all the details of how bad the situation was at that time due to the use of unauthorized point of origin tactical codes.

The film also contained a tape recording of the staff briefing that informed General Abrams, USARV Commander, of the situation. He said at that time, "We have got to get the word out to all the corps and division commanders that these goddamn guys are reading their mail and this is just terrible, terrible." How's that for a quote? This film should be viewed by all current users of point of origin codes for more details.

The point is that even if the point of origin is moved as often as is possible in the grid system shown in the article, history shows that the point of origin method is just not secure!!! We have enough Americans dead to prove that!

The only way to assure operational security for troops in combat is to: use only NSA approved and supplied codes and ciphers; on-line encrypt all transmissions when possible; take the time to encrypt all map coordinates with the NSA supplied numeral cipher/authentication system; follow only authorized transmission procedures; and use common sense. And don't underestimate even a "low tech" enemy.

General Abrams was correct when he said, "We have got to get the word out!" **The Vietnamese taught us a hard lesson. We paid for it; let's not forget it.**

David M. Fiedler
Fort Monmouth, NJ

Dear Editor:

The "Total Force" column in your April-June 1993 issue begs for a couple of comments. The first goes to the issue of selecting the best available talent for MI Detachment (Strategic) (MID[S]) slots. Although MID(S) are often accused of using the "old boy" network and supporting the practice of "homesteading" their officers, or rotating them between MID(s), I would submit that the general population of RC MI officers is equally at fault. Case in point: I recently requested a spread sheet to fill the major slot in my MID(S). I sent letters to the 12 officers I deemed best qualified for the position. Most were either S2s or assigned to an MI battalion; no letters went out to officers already serving in MID(S). Out of those dozen letters, only two officers responded to express an interest in the position.

RC MI officers need to take some responsibility for planning their own careers. They need to be thoroughly familiar with **AR 135-382, Reserve Component Military Intelligence**

Unit and Personnel, especially Chapter 5, if they are interested in assignment to a MID(S). If they read this chapter carefully, they will see that there are fairly strict requirements for selection as a MID(S) commander. Without previous MID(S) experience, or other strategic intelligence background, they are not likely to meet the qualifications. My advice to RC MI officers who strive for career advancement is simple: Get into the MID(S) program as a major, then try to find a slot as a G2 or battalion commander. But remember that virtually all the O6 command slots in the RC are in the MID(S) program. If you want to make O6 as an RC MI officer, the best way to do it is to make sure you are qualified to command a MID(S).

My second comment is a linguistic one. While CONUS armies may, indeed, be losing command and control of the Reserves, that is not their "raison d'etat." It is, however, their "raison d'etre," or reason for existence to those who do not speak French. With so many MI linguists reading your publication, you need to make sure you do not permit such a faux pas.

COL Larry J. Brown
Ames, IA

Dear Editor:

The April-June 1993 issue contains Michael S. Evancevich's article, "Danger in the Balkans," about the conflict in Yugoslavia. The contents page blurb describing this article has two serious intelligence failures. It refers to Yugoslavia as having been "under the shroud of Soviet dominance," and as a "former Soviet republic." As most students of the Balkans know, Yugoslavia broke away from Soviet dominance around 1949, although Tito maintained a Soviet-style state. However, at no time was Yugoslavia ever a "Soviet republic."

Mark M. Lowenthal
Washington, D.C.

To better support your articles, we are requesting our readers to send photographs of MI operations, equipment, and exercises. These should be copyright free, include the full name of the photographer, and a brief note explaining what is in the picture. They can be color or black and white, fairly clear, in focus, and include a way to contact the photographer/owner. Unit PAOs are also encouraged to contact us as a resource.

PROFESSIONAL READING



To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign by Stephen W. Sears (New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1992) 468 pages, \$24.95.

To the Gates of Richmond is an authoritative account of one of the largest campaigns of the Civil War, and one of the least studied. In the same graphic detail as his earlier work on Antietam, **Landscape Turned Red**, Sears uses hundreds of diaries and other firsthand accounts that allow readers to view the campaign from different perspectives. Included are personal accounts from General Lee and General McClellan, and one from a private who marched 20 miles with Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley. Reminiscent of Ken Burns' PBS documentary **The Civil War**, the abundant use of primary sources gives readers the "feel" of the battle.

To the Gates of Richmond is a superb study of warfare—from tactics, to logistics, to the importance of timely, accurate intelligence. However, several aspects are of keen interest to MI professionals. It is during the Peninsula Campaign that aerial balloon reconnaissance is first used, and Sears explains how this impacted the battles. Sears also studies the campaign of "knowing your enemy." He shows how Lee was able to capitalize on both the reconnaissance of J.E.B. Stuart and a detailed knowledge of how McClellan would react in certain situations. Sears shows how McClellan was a victim of poor intelligence, in particular, the grossly exaggerated troop estimates from his intelligence chief Detective Allan Pinkerton.

Stephen Sears' trademark is that he brings to his work an incredible amount

of research. This fact makes **To the Gates of Richmond** a truly significant work, on a level with those of Bruce Catton and Shelby Foote. Detailed maps with operational graphics clarify the complex series of maneuvers that make up the siege of Yorktown, Seven Pines, and the Seven Days battles. In addition, photographs of the terrain, such as the Chickahominy River, show readers why certain tactical decisions were made. Sears even includes an order of battle for each series of battles.

While **To the Gates of Richmond** would be of most interest to an avid Civil War buff, anyone interested in military history and strategy will enjoy this book. Though it reads easily as a tale of history, there are important lessons here that make it significant for today's soldier.

2LT Christopher J. Hamilton
Fort Monmouth, NJ

The War Between the Spies: A History of Espionage During the American Civil War by Alan Axelrod (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1992) 320 pages, \$23.00.

Historian Alan Axelrod covers the exploits of individuals involved in espionage and counterespionage, on both sides of the conflict, during the American Civil War. The first part is interesting and entertaining. Discussions include how these people decided to enter the world of espionage, what they did during their tenure, and what became of them at the end of the war.

Eventually, though, the stories become repetitive. Whether this is due to writing style or that these spies repeated

the same activities throughout the war is difficult to say. Also, Axelrod tries to cover too many people and does not fully explore any one person's exploits. Axelrod briefly describes the beginnings of "intelligence" agencies and procedures and tries to relate them to procedures that had been developed over decades in Europe.

Even with its flaws, the book is good reading. Axelrod does a good job of relating previous story personalities to the new one he is discussing. This makes it easy to follow who's who. With a good list of sources, this is a useful research tool for anyone interested in this period. The only major fallacy is in referencing the stories. While he has a large bibliography, there are no footnotes to reference specific information to. The book would have benefited by including an index. Overall, this is definitely worthwhile reading.

CPT Lewis Field
SDARNG

MacArthur's ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942-1945 by Edward J. Drea (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1992), 296 pages, \$29.95.

I cannot recommend this book strongly enough to any student of military intelligence. It's the best historical work I've read on the application of intelligence in Army operations. By detailing the use and effect of ULTRA—intelligence from decrypted intercepts of Japanese military traffic—in one theater of operations, it provides a superb study of the complexities, power, and ultimately, limitations of intelligence.

Drea describes communications intelligence's role in General Douglas MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Theater from 1942 to 1945. He begins by outlining how the Central Bureau, MacArthur's codebreaking organization, was formed and evolved during the Pacific war. Then Drea evaluates the effect ULTRA had on MacArthur's operational planning and decisions during his New Guinea and Philippine campaigns. He shows how the Central Bureau struggled in 1942 to break Japanese Army codes, made breakthroughs in 1943, and then provided vital information in 1944 and 1945. This information was invaluable in the air and sea war against Japan, but was less critical in the ground campaigns. Instead, MacArthur's use of ULTRA was inconsistent.

Drea began his book believing that a study of ULTRA would help explain some of the puzzling decisions and gambles that MacArthur made in World War II. To a degree, his belief was justified. In the light of available ULTRA, MacArthur's Hollandia operation appears a decisive blow at a Japanese



weakness, rather than a reckless gamble. But while he followed his intelligence in some cases, MacArthur ignored it in others, notably the invasion of the Philippines. Drea partly attributes this uneven use of ULTRA to its own inconsistencies. He also argues that MacArthur "consistently dismissed ULTRA evidence that failed to accord with his preconceived strategic vision." Drea's observations on the relationships between intelligence, strategy, and personality are fascinating.

MacArthur's ULTRA is a first-rate history. Drea's cogent and detailed analysis is backed by impressive research. Not only has he made huge inroads into recently declassified documents on American SIGINT efforts, but he also drew extensively on Japanese sources. This balance enabled Drea to compare stories from both sides of the Pacific, resulting in an accurate picture of both the American and Japanese operational situation. This, in turn, permitted a more valid assessment of the effectiveness of ULTRA. Combined with clear writing and provocative arguments, balance and accuracy make this book the standard work on the topic.

Along with his historical skill, readers will appreciate Drea's understanding of the intelligence craft. Throughout the book, Drea credits the success of ULTRA to hard work, practical experience, and rigorous analysis, rather than spectacular and sensational radio intercepts. He points to the importance of all-source intelligence, and the ever-present need to know the enemy's tactics and methods. Drea also offers some interesting sidelights on the techniques and procedures of the Central Bureau, although he focuses on the use of ULTRA during the campaign, not the details of decryption and analysis. Drea admits that he found no overall template that would outline intelligence cause to operational effect; however, reading MacArthur's ULTRA would profit any intelligence professional.

CPT Michael E. Bigelow
Fort Huachuca, AZ

Reconstituting America's Defense—The New U.S. National Security Strategy by James J. Tritten and Paul N. Stockton, editors (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992), 169 pages, \$42.95.

"With the slate virtually wiped clean, it is difficult to anticipate the impact of the new national security strategy." With this statement as their apparent charter, the editors jump headlong into the nation's ongoing security policy debate. Through

a series of essays, they discuss several sources of friction in the implementation of the new strategy. The authors offer no solutions. Instead, they present the problem and, occasionally, their personal biases.

The new strategy is thoroughly scrutinized with such topics as the base force, intelligence requirements, the Gulf War, Congressional response, maritime strategy, and nuclear policy. With all of its diversity, it provides neither balanced debate nor comprehensive discussion. Instead, it is more of a collection of opinions and advocacies, some more thoughtful than others.

The hazards of trying to capture such a contemporary issue in a book is clearly demonstrated. In fact, some of the discussions have already been overcome by events. Just as the change in administration has made the base force discussion moot, so it is with the discussion of the open-ocean warfighting maritime strategy. Not only does the argument fail to recognize the fractured former Soviet Navy, but it also fails to recognize the U.S. Navy's shift to a "brown water" power projection emphasis.

One of the most cogent and recurring themes is the futility of the reconstitution pillar of the national strategy. Addressed in various ways, the consensus is best captured in this single sentence: "U.S. strategists will probably join their European colleagues and relegate reconstitution to the scrap heap of strategic bumper stickers whose time has passed."

If the editors wanted to promote a dialogue by stirring debate and disagreement, they hit the mark. If, however, they wanted to present a structured, balanced argument to support the various opinions, they missed the mark.

This book is not for those seeking a comprehensive analysis of our nation's new national security strategy. It does, however, provide some valuable historic context and ample food for thought. It is not the most current or complete book available on the subject, but it is worth reading. For intelligence professionals, the discussions of the impact of the new strategy on intelligence operations is of particular interest.

LTC Donald R. Faint
Carlisle Barracks, PA

Thompson Chain Reference Bible (new international version) by Various Authors (Indianapolis: B.B. Kirkbride Bible Co., Inc., 1991) 1,933 pages, \$47.96

As a chaplain during Operation Just Cause, I read the Bible as a survival guide. As the NTC senior chaplain trainer, I reread it from a whole new perspective, that of a BOS integrator. I am struck by its recurring reference to R&S. As a BOS integrator, I recommend that every MI soldier read the Bible to reinforce the doctrine stated in FM 34-2-1, **Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counter-reconnaissance**.

Let me identify several scriptures that show the value the Lord put on R&S. First, He directed Moses to send out

spies and explore the land of Canaan (Numbers 13:1-33). Moses restated their mission: conduct a battlefield area evaluation and include a terrain analysis and threat evaluation (FM 34-2-1). Moses' PIR included: "See what the land is like and whether the people who live there are strong or weak, few or many. What kind of land do they live in? Is it good or bad? What kinds of towns do they live in? Are they unwarlike or fortified? How is the soil? Is it fertile or poor? Are there trees on it or not? Do your best to bring back some of the fruit of the land." (Numbers 13:18-20). The fruit of the land is an example of biblical technical intelligence.

The subsequent problem for Moses was poor reporting and evaluation of those reports. Moses queried his subordinates: "Is the asset accurately reporting what it sees based on its capabilities? Does the report answer the original question?" (FM 34-2-1)

Of the 12 HUMINTers Moses sent out, only Joshua and Caleb gave honest reports of the land and enemy capabilities. They said the Israelites should go and take the land. However, the other 10 spies went beyond their R&S mission. They exaggerated enemy capabilities and their negative reports spread fear, despair, and hopelessness among the people. Based on these reports, the Israelites' COA was to return to the desert and not to enter Canaan.

Joshua later became the new leader of the Israelites. He remembered the lessons learned from R&S and accompanying SALUTE reports. As he prepared to enter Canaan, he too directed spies to reconnoiter Jericho, the city on the Israelites' main avenue of approach to Canaan. (Joshua 2:1-24) The Jericho counter-reconnaissance effort did not keep spies from completing their mission. Joshua then led the Israelites to victory at Jericho (initial objective) and then on to victory at the city of Ai (subsequent objective). True to my observations of NTC unit ministry training, the unit (Israelites) did not incorporate lessons learned in future operations.

In transitioning from a deliberate attack to a hasty defense while consolidating on the objective, Joshua's staff failed to plan, prepare, and execute counter-reconnaissance. (Joshua 9:1-27) The Gibeonites developed a ruse to enter into a treaty with the Israelites. Some of them dressed up in old, patched clothes and carried stale, moldy bread. During debriefings they told the Israelites they had traveled from a distant land and wished to live in peace with them. In fact, they were very close to Ai and they feared the Israelites would conquer them. Joshua fell for the deception, agreed to the treaty, and allowed the Gibeonites to remain in the conquered land.

The Bible tells us that having an awareness of your area of operations (BAE) and a vision of your destiny (PIR/IR) and obtaining knowledge (R&S) will all fail you if you don't capture lessons learned and train to those lessons. The Bible is an excellent example of relevant history and should be reread as your experiences expand your horizons. Amen.

Chaplain (MAJ) Daniel J.H. Paul
Fort Irwin, CA

Barons of the Sky by Wayne Biddle (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 348 pages, \$22.95.

Wayne Biddle writes of the early aerospace industry as if he's telling a story of the old Wild West. He focuses on such people as Glenn Martin of Martin Marietta, Donald Douglas of McDonnell Douglas, Jack Northrop of Northrop, and Allan and Malcolm Loughhead of Lockheed. These founders of the American aerospace industry did whatever they had to do to build their business. Much of the early excesses and unethical practices led to much of the procurement and development regulation we have as law today.

Biddle has reviewed personal papers of these men to build and substantiate his story. One of the fascinating facts about these early founders was that besides Douglas, none of them had any engineering background. These men made their mark primarily by building their aerospace businesses. All of them experienced periodic failures and funding shortages.

Early problems for the aerospace industry were R&D costs and controlling the sale of military hardware to foreign powers. The book relates the sequence of events that led up to the sinking of the British ocean liner *Lusitania* by a German U-boat in May 1915 and its link with weapon transfers to Britain.

This is fascinating reading about the various means the aircraft industry used to keep itself afloat. The importance of sales of planes with marked-up prices to foreign governments was crucial, especially during the Depression. Biddle offers clear evidence that Donald Douglas sold pre-World War II aviation technology to Germany. Douglas also did business with Japan, even when it was obvious that Japan was gearing up for military action. The planes Douglas sold in the 1930's gave Japan the technological advances used in the design of the Zero.

More evidence indicates that even after Congress enacted a law in 1939 forbidding American citizens to deliver weapons to belligerent European nations, Lockheed circumvented this law. They purchased an airstrip straddling the Canadian border and dragged planes across the border before delivery. Biddle also presents evidence of the Roosevelt administration's encouragement of foreign aviation sales.

Biddle's descriptions of aviation companies' efforts to raise capital are enlightening, to say the least, as is the story of the development of the aerospace industry. Anyone involved in procurement should read this book and I heartily recommend it to anyone interested in business development.

1LT William Keith Everett
Tucson, AZ

Mates and Muchachos: Unit Cohesion in the Falklands/Malvinas War by Nora Kinzer Stewart (McLean, VA: Brassey's, 1991), 192 pages, \$22.00.

It is interesting that someone who has never served in the armed forces could paint a more accurate picture of the military than those who have dedicated their entire lives to it. Nora Kinzer Stewart does just that in her book *Mates and Muchachos*. Clearly, she understands the factors that build unit cohesion.

This book provides military leaders a step-by-step guide to build cohesion in military units. Using the 1982 Falkland Islands War as a case study, Stewart examines units with good cohesion (and that fought well) and units with poor cohesion (and that fought poorly).

Stewart argues that unit cohesion is an unseen force multiplier that often can turn the tide of the battle. Military cohesion, she states, comes from four sources: peer bonding, vertical bonding, organizational bonding, and socio-military relationships.

As evidence to her scholarly skills, Stewart provides an extraordinary number of footnotes. She acknowledges and draws from the works of all the well-known researchers on military cohesion. Her arguments are well constructed and complement each other. Most valuable, though, are her interviews with both Argentine and British soldiers. These really make the book. Additionally, she manages to go through the entire book with a remarkable lack of bias.

Leaders, or those who aspire to positions of leadership, will find this book helpful in increasing cohesion in their own units. The book is as good as Reuven Gal's classic, *Portrait of an Is-*

raeli Soldier, but more concise and easier to read. Additionally, intelligence professionals will be able to use the country studies of both Argentina and Great Britain as an example of how to study a nation's military.

Frank K. Sobchak
Hinesville, GA

North American Spies: New Revisionist Essays edited by Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones and Andrew Lownie (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1991), 256 pages, \$40.00.

Historians have opened a Pandora's box. They begin to question some of our basic beliefs about history's treatment of military intelligence and how it has evolved throughout this century. Written by University of Edinburgh graduate students, *North American Spies: New Revisionist Essays* is a collection of 10 essays which cast doubt on previously held beliefs.

This is not the best intelligence history book I've read, but it does have something for everyone. The most interesting essays were Richard B. Laidlaw's "The OSS and the Burma Road 1942-45"; Danny D. Jansen and Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones' "The Missouri Gang and the CIA"; and Patrick Mescal's "The Birth of the Defense Intelligence Agency."

A discussion on how military historians interpret intelligence decisions and how the larger society views our endeavors is especially relevant. It points out the danger that, if we're not careful, intelligence could become a large unwieldy bureaucracy. This book is worth checking out at the local library, but save your money for a title with less academic overtures.

CPT Eric K. Naeseth



177th

Military Intelligence Company

The 177th Military Intelligence Company crest is divided in half. In traditional MI oriental blue, the upper left portion deals with our U.S. Army mission. The crossed lightning bolt represents electronic warfare and the key is for knowledge and wisdom. The lower left portion deals with our OPFOR mission. The black background is the color of the 60th Guards Motorized Rifle Division. The red star inside the red circle represents the state of Krasnovia, and the Cyrillic writing stands for the OPFOR. The Cyrillic writing surrounding the crest means the Radioelectronic Radio Technical Reconnaissance Company.

The 177th Military Intelligence Company has the proud tradition of being one of the oldest units at the National Training Center. The Electronic Warfare/Radio Electronic Combat (EW/REC) Detachment was conceived at a conference at Fort Leavenworth, September 15, 1980. It was activated in July 1981 at the same time as the NTC from elements of the 194th MI Battalion from Fort Knox, KY. It was assigned to NTC's A Company on October 16, 1983.

The unit was redesignated as the 355th MI Company (Provisional) and attached to the 177th Armored Brigade (Prov) on May 8, 1987. The company was activated as a tables of distribution and allowances (TDA) unit as the 177th MI Company (Prov) in October 1987.


The 177th MI Company became an modified tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) unit on February 16, 1988, and was attached to the 177th Forward Support Battalion in July 1988.

The mission of the 177th MI Company is to provide electronic warfare and signal intelligence support to the 177th Armored Brigade (OPFOR). The MI company is comprised of five platoons and a headquarters section.

The ground surveillance radar platoon provides combat intelligence through radar operations to the regimental S2. Collection and jamming platoons provide signals intelligence, radio direction finding, and electronic countermeasures support. The operations platoon coordinates the intelligence gathering process and provides analysis of combat information to the S2. The maintenance platoon, comprised of motor and electronic maintenance sections, provides the company with its own organizational-level and higher maintenance capability.


During the monthly force-on-force rotations at the NTC, the 177th MI Company doctrinally replicates portions of a Soviet-style Radio and Radar Reconnaissance Company (R³CO).

The 177th MI Company has been selected by the Association of Old Crows as the Army's Outstanding Electronic Warfare Unit in 1983 and in 1992 for its dedication to training U.S. Army units in electronic warfare threat and its work in joint jamming operations with the 41st Electronic Combat Squadron from Tucson, AZ.



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